Sotah 056

1:
We have already explained the special aura of sanctity that surrounded the priest, an aura that has persisted in many quarters long after the Bet Mikdash has been out of existence. This perception that the priest who ministered in the holy shrine was different from other men and had to maintain a special holiness in his personal situations was particularly apparent with regards to restrictions that were placed on his marital relationships. Our mishnah must be understood in this light. One might assume that if a priest suspected his wife of infidelity and put her to the ordeal of the 'cursing waters' that this suspicion in itself should be sufficient cause to require him to divorce her in order that he maintain his distance from anything that might compromise his sanctity. Our mishnah teaches that there is no need to go to such an extreme: if his wife suffers the ordeal of the 'cursing waters' and the result is that she is innocent her husband may continue his relationship with her as before.

2:
The halakhic tradition recognizes two kinds of eunuch: men who were born incapable of propagation because of a physical defect; and men who became incapable of propagation because of human intervention. The Torah [Deuteronomy 23:2] prohibits the marriage of an Israelite woman to such a person. In his commentary on this verse of the Torah Rabbenu Bechayye teaches that the reason for this prohibition is because "the main purpose of marriage is propagation and since such a union would be childless of necessity it should be prevented…" However, the sages carefully interpreted the verse as meaning that it was only an Israelite woman that a eunuch could not marry, but that he would be permitted to marry a woman who was of 'tainted' lineage such as a proselyte or a manumitted bondwoman.

3:
At the very beginning of our study of this tractate we noted the formality that a husband must first have warned his wife not to consort with a certain person, otherwise he would not be able to bring her to the ordeal. All our present mishnah seeks to clarify is that such a warning can be issued by the husband concerning all 'arayot'. The term 'ervah' (plural: 'arayot') indicates any man who is forbidden to a woman – mainly (but not exclusively) because of some family relationship that exists between them. The husband is entitled to warn his wife, in the presence of competent witnesses, not to consort with her brother, for example. The permission granted to the husband to warn his wife not to consort with a certain man applies even as regards men in whose company a woman is otherwise permitted to seclude herself – her father or her son, for instance.

4:
The Torah [Numbers 5:20] is interpreted by the sages very exactly:

'Some man' is understood to exclude anything that cannot be included in this category: a minor or a non-human animal. A minor, for the purposes of 'arayot' is a male under nine years of age.

I wrote: There is a tendency within our Movement to try to solve halakhic issues by re-interpretation of the biblical text. I have always been very wary of such attempts for a very simple reason. One of the pillars of rabbinic Judaism – and our Movement prides itself in being a part of rabbinic Judaism – is that the Torah is not to be understood (for halakhic purposes) as we might understand it, but the basis of halakhic development is the teaching of the Torah as the sages understood it. If we take away that plank we are in danger of allowing the whole building to collapse. It is far better, in my view, to seek the rectification of halakhot that have in time become 'problematic' by using the tools that the halakhic system afford, rather than re-interpreting the text of the Torah.

Jim Feldman writes:

The problem with this view of Judaism is that it does not admit the possibility that the rabbis of the Talmud times were simply codifying the terrible prejudices of their own times. The principal issue that hangs there in such splendor before us is gender prejudice. Another issue that has since been circumvented (of necessity) is the strict adherence to the laws of usury. If the fundamental premise is simply wrong (e.g., the sun rotates around the earth), you get nowhere by trying to work through that premise to arrive at "good" answers (e.g., the Ptolomeic epicyclic scheme). It is good to examine the premise itself. If the rabbinic legacy is to be examined for the wisdom it imparts to us, it must also be examined for the human frailties of its authors. If we are going to say RIGHT when they are right, we have to be able to say WRONG when they really blow it. Of course, such an approach is only possible if one does not begin with the premise that God dictated the Torah and continue with the fundamental assumption of most halakhic commentary that older commentators, who are thus closer to the original dictation of Torah, are always wiser than those that follow.

I respond:

I agree with the spirit of all Jim's premises, and yet maintain my own position as indicated above. Of course the sages got things wrong! I wouldn't be a Conservative Jew if I held otherwise. My problem is not in recognizing that the way the sages interpreted the text of the Torah could be wrong and influenced by historical prejudices: that is granted. My problem is with the manner in which we tackle the situation they have left us. I believe that, as Jews who base themselves on the rabbinic system, we should not say that 'the sages interpreted the verse one way, we will interpret it another'. We are not the sages. I believe that what we should do is to find within the rabbinic methodology that they have handed down to us ways and means of showing that one can reach a more acceptable conclusion.

One example may suffice (prompted by a message sent me by Derek Fields which also dealt with this topic). It is very easy to say that the sages interpreted Leviticus 18:22 in one way, but we shall interpret it in another way and thus obviate the problem (as we now see it). Very easy, but unrabbinic. However difficult it may be I believe that we should make the effort to show that our modern view of what is prescribed in that verse can be substantiated out of the rabbinic tradition itself.

The same would apply, to my mind, to the status of the kohen in our day and age – which has been the subject of our discussions for the past few shiurim. (I am surprised that no one raised the question!)