Sanhedrin 124

1:
We already noted in our last Shiur that there is a difference between the division of the mishnayot in the manuscript codices and the Talmuds. In the Babylonian Talmud the first mishnah of the chapter, as given in the manuscript codices, is divided into smaller units. I have followed this arrangement (for didactic reasons) so our present mishnah is marked Mishnah One "second part".

2:
The Torah stipulates:

The Torah also stipulates:

Mishnah 4 of Chapter Seven has already taught us that the penalty for cursing a parent is death by stoning [see Sanhedrin 091]. Our present mishnah now adds to that death by strangulation is mandated for the person found guilty of inflicting bodily harm on a parent.

3:
Our mishnah seeks to restrict the applicability of this requirement of the Torah by stipulating that only when actual physical damage to the body is caused by the blow is this considered to be "striking a parent".

4:
This law elicits an interesting discussion in the Gemara [Sanhedrin 84b]. One can understand the purpose of this law as being to discourage angry offspring inflicting mayhem on a parent, but what would be the case when the physical damage is to the parent's benefit? In earlier times the universal cure for all illnesses was considered to be bloodletting (just as too many today think that the universal panacea for all "common or garden" illnesses is antibiotics). In order to draw off a quantity of blood an incision had to be made, of course. Could a son perform this service for a father? The Gemara quotes one view that quite reasonably suggests that where the wound is for medicinal purposes obviously the son may not be held culpable. However, this is immediately followed by the information that certain great Babylonian Amora'im thought otherwise:

The final conclusion of the Gemara seems to follow the second view. Surprisingly, Rabbi Yosef Caro in his Shulĥan Arukh [Yoreh De'ah 241:3] rules that all things being equal a child should not perform such services for a parent, but if one does so they may not be held culpable. More encouraging is the gloss made there by Rabbi Moshe Isserles to the effect that if the parent is suffering and there is no one else present who can do the deed, the child must do what is necessary.

5:
Even more curious is the discussion [Sanhedrin 85a] as to the situation of an officer of the court vis-à-vis his parent. If his parent has been sentenced to a flogging and he, the son, is the bailiff whose task it is to administer these floggings, what should he do? One view quoted in the Gemara is that just as any person may not inflict bodily harm on another and yet this is permitted for judicial purposes, so would the same reasoning apply in the case of a son and a parent: while there is a general prohibition against striking a parent, this would be permitted when done for judicial purposes – "for the honour of heaven". Another view suggests that just as one is generally charged with refraining from inflicting bodily harm on another and should take steps to avoid doing so, so in this case the son, who is generally charged with not inflicting bodily harm on his parent, should take steps to avoid being in this situation. (Logic suggests to me that here taking a leave of absence would be appropriate!)

In Sanhedrin 122 I suggested that the laws permitting people in certain very strictly circumscribed circumstances taking the law into their own hands might possibly be explained as a deterrent. Mike Rodin adds another angle:

I wonder if by legitimizing the actions of zealots to punish to a few serious offenses, the Rabbis intended to warn people who might be tempted to take the law into their own hands that they should take care unless they exceed their authority and themselves face punishment.

Juan-Carlos Kiel writes on the same issue:

If "there is no evidence that any of the cases detailed by our mishnah were ever given practical application" then what is the object of this law? Just an intelectual exercise? A way to build an internal world, different of the external and hostile world of the Gola, an irreal world in which the jew was free to dream with impossible things?

I respond:

I do not accept the intellectualizing of Juan-Carlos in this case. I have often pointed out that the sages preferred dealing with concrete situations (however unlikely) to ethereal theorizing. The discussion on whether a son may let his father's blood has obvious implications today: may a son give an insulin injection to a diabetic parent who is unable to do it for themselves? The ultimate answer of the Rema (Isserles) is "yes, if only he can do so", which is obviously influenced by the discussion in the Gemara that I quoted in the Shiur. But we can go further. When we were studying Chapter Eight we noted the view of the Gemara that "there never was and never will be a stubborn and rebellious son" – a topic which lasted throughout one whole chapter! The obvious question presents itself: if the "stubborn and rebellious son" is a non-event, why is it mentioned at all in the Torah? To which the Gemara responds: for the virtue of studying it and the benefits that accrue from that study.

In that same Shiur (Samhedrin 122) I explained about the Shewbread – that it "consisted of twelve wafers that were placed on the golden table and changed weekly".

David Shemano asks:

The reference to wafers and wine – are you aware of any historical connection with the Catholic mass?

I respond:

On the contrary, I believe that there is no connection between the Shewbread and the wine libation with the Catholic Mass (or the Protestant Communion). The texts used in these ceremonies make it quite clear that the origin of the wafer used is the Matzah eaten at the Seder service on Passover and the origin of the wine is in the four cups of wine that are drunk during that service.