Sanhedrin 066
|
BET MIDRASH VIRTUALI
of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel
RABIN MISHNAH STUDY GROUP
|
|
|
אֶחָד דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְאֶחָד דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: "מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם".
מַה בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת? דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלשָׁה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלשָׁה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת פּוֹתְחִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת פּוֹתְחִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין פּוֹתְחִין לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד לִזְכוּת וְעַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַחֲזִירִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַחֲזִירִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין מַחֲזִירִין לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְאֵין הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין חוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת וְהַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת מְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת, אֲבָל הַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר וּלְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּלַּיְלָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּיּוֹם. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת גוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַיּוֹם בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַיּוֹם לִזְכוּת וּבְיוֹם שֶׁלְּאַחֲרָיו לְחוֹבָה; לְפִיכָךְ אֵין דָּנִין לֹא בְעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וְלֹא בְעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב:
Both Dinei Mamonot and Dinei Nefashot require "examination" and "investigation", for the Torah [Leviticus 24:22] states that "You shall have but one judgment [procedure]".
What is the difference between Dinei Mamonot and Dinei Nefashot? Dinei Mamonot is before three, while Dinei Nefashot is before twenty-three. [The judges' discussion in a case of] Dinei Mamonot may start either for the claimant or for the defendant, while with Dinei Nefashot it must be started by an opinion in favour of the accused. In Dinei Mamonot a majority of one is sufficient in finding either for or against the claimant, while in Dinei Nefashot a majority of one is sufficient to acquit but a majority of at least two is required to convict. A retrial may be required in Dinei Mamonot regardless of whether it is to the benefit or to the detriment of the claimant, while a retrial may be required in Dinei Nefashot only if it is to the benefit of the accused. In Dinei Mamonot anyone may speak on behalf of acquittal or condemnation, while in Dinei Nefashot anyone may speak on behalf of acquittal but not everyone may speak on behalf of condemnation. In Dinei Mamonot [during the discussion] anyone can freely change their opinion as regards acquittal or condemnation, while in Dinei Nefashot only a judge who has expressed an opinion for condemnation may change his opinion and a judge who has expressed an opinion in favour of acquittal may not change his opinion. [A case involving] Dinei Mamonot may be started in the morning and concluded after nightfall while [a case involving] Dinei Nefashot may not be concluded after nightfall [but must be adjourned to the following day]. [A case involving] Dinei Mamonot may be concluded on the same day as it was started regardless of to whose benefit the verdict may be, while [a case involving] Dinei Nefashot may be concluded on the same day as it started only if judgment is for acquittal but it must be adjourned to the following day if judgment is for condemnation. That is why such cases may not be heard on Fridays or on the eve of festivals. EXPLANATIONS (continued):
5: 6: 7:
All judges of Dinei Mamonot, if they erred in their judgment, could be sued by the wronged party for monetary redress (out of the judge's own purse); but sages who had received a licence from the lay leadership could not be sued for errors in judgment. An interesting story is recounted [Sanhedrin 33a] in this regard. On one occasion the following question came before Rabbi Tarfon [Eretz-Israel, beginning of 2nd century CE]: could the meat from a cow that had been ritually slaughtered be considered kasher if the cow's womb had been removed during its lifetime? Rabbi Tarfon obviously considered that no cow could survive for long after such an operation, and therefore determined that the meat should be "cast to the dogs" [Exodus 22:30], since the cow was 'dying' at the moment of slaughter. The owner of the cow (who presumably had hoped to make a fine profit, appealed to the sages of the Sanhedrin assembled in Yavneh. Todos the physician reported to the assembly that no cow or pig could be exported from Alexandria [in Egypt] unless its womb had first been removed – so that it could not subsequently give birth. (This was a measure to protect the rarity of these animals of superior quality, so that they could not be bred outside Egypt and so that their value would remain high.) This evidence obviously indicated that Rabbi Tarfon had been wrong in his assumption that the cow in question could not have survived the hysterectomy; this, in turn meant that the meat that Rabbi Tarfon had "fed to the dogs" was kasher, after all. Rabbi Tarfon immediately recognized his mistake with the rueful remark, "There goes your donkey, Tarfon!" – meaning that he would have to sell his donkey in order to compensate the owner of the cow out of his own pocket. A young student of his, later to be come the eternally renowned Rabbi Akiva, told him not to worry: he need not compensate the owner of the cow since he (Tarfon) was a "mumĥeh la-rabbim" [a publicly recognized specialist].
8:
In the case of Dinei Nefashot it is highly unlikely that the judges would be guilty of an error, for if there was the slightest doubt they would acquit. However, a re-trial in a case of Dinei Nefashot is certainly possible in the event of new evidence being proffered. The Torah [Exodus 23:7] warns "… and do not slay an innocent and upright person, for I do not justify the wicked". The verse has a seeming superfluity: in this context, someone who is innocent is upright [tzaddik] and someone who is "tzaddik" is innocent. The Gemara [Sanhedrin 33b] uses this phenomenon in order to deduce a rule:
There is a Baraita which reads: Where [does the Torah teach] that if someone leaves the court guilty and someone else claims that they have a point to raise in his favour that he is brought back [into court]? – The Torah says "Do not slay an innocent person". And where [does the Torah teach] that if someone leaves the court acquitted and someone else claims that that have a point to raise that could be detrimental to him that he is not brought back [for a re-trial]? – The Torah says "Do not slay an upright person".
Once a person has been acquitted in Dinei Nefashot, he is held to be upright once again.
To be continued. |