Sanhedrin 063

1:
The last mishnah of this chapter deals with the possibility of rescinding a verdict. Our mishnah consists of three parts which we traditionally refer to as Reisha, Emtza'ita and Seifa [first, middle and last part of a mishnah]. The Reisha and the Emtza'ita present a Maĥloket [disagreement] between two sages – Rabban Shim'on ben-Gamli'el and the anonymous sage to whose view he is opposed, whom we call Tanna Kamma [the first Tanna].

2:
Every case must end with a verdict, and in Dinei Mamonot this means that the judges must find either for the claimant or for the defendant. Under normal circumstances the loser has the right to demand that the case be re-opened if new evidence is forthcoming. Tanna Kamma would give the judges the right to circumscribe this possibility, and require the person against whom their verdict went to bring fresh proof within – say – thirty days. Rabban Shim'on ben-Gamli'el was the head of the Sanhedrin in the difficult period of national reconstruction subsequent to the abject failure of the Bar-Kokhba revolt (which was savagely put down by the Romans in 135 CE). He points out that such a right is not in the best interests of justice: if a person finds further proof that could rescind the verdict that went against him and restore his money to him, but discovered this proof only after the time-limit set by the court – does this mean that he cannot have judicial redress? Shall he lose his legitimate property because of a calendrical date?!

3:
In the Gemara [Sanhedrin 31a] Rabba bar-Rav Huna says that the view of Rabban Shim'on ben-Gamli'el is accepted Halakhah and not the view of Tanna Kamma, and that any time-limit set by the court for the introduction of new evidence has no judicial standing whatsoever. This is Halakhah to this day:

4:
The Emtza'ita follows exactly the same pattern – but the Halakhah is different. If the litigant tells the court that he has no witnesses or no evidence to support his claim he cannot subsequently produce them. Rashi [Rabbi Shelomo Yitzĥaki, Western Europe, 12th century CE] explains [Sanhedrin 31a] that this would bear too heavy an odour of fabrication of evidence. The obvious difference between the situation in the Reisha and the Emtza'ita is that in the latter, when asked by the court to produce evidence he replied that there was no evidence at all; whereas in the Reisha it is clear that the litigant does not claim that there is no evidence only that he cannot produce it at this time. Rabban Shim'on ben-Gamli'el here also would give the defendant the right to produce belated evidence, but the Gemara does not accept his view in this matter – though it admits that under certain conditions such new evidence might be admitted in order to serve the interests of justice, even when the defendant has already stated that he has no evidence or no further evidence. Rather unusually, the Gemara [still Sanhedrin 31a] quotes a "true life" story:

5:
The Seifa of our mishnah is quite clear and needs no elaborate explanation. If a litigant has claimed all along that he has no evidence and suddenly produces evidence from his pocket just when the judges are about to pronounce against him – there can be nothing more suspect than this!

6:
Some time ago one of the participants in our shiurim asked about where such cases were to be heard when the claimant and the defendant could not agree. I then gave a brief response. This is now the topic dealt with by the Gemara at the very end of chapter three [Sanhedrin 31b].

The obvious reason why one of the parties would be wary of having the case heard locally is the expertise (or lack of it) of local lay arbitrators. But, Rabbi Yoĥanan points out, there is nothing to stop the arbitrators writing down their queries and sending them to the expert of their choice.

The Gemara finally decides that the place where such cases are to be heard is decided by the creditor, on the basis of a verse [Proverbs 22:7] – "The debtor is subject to the creditor".

I wrote: "Dinei Mamonot" … refers to a case in which the plaintiff claims that the defendant owes him (or her) money."

Zackary Berger writes:

This use of "him (or her)" raises a question, assuming you're using the phrase for reasons beyond gender-neutral language. There are, I know, … several recorded cases in the Gemara of women being called as witnesses in cases where women are involved. With what frequency did women appear before the Beit Din in cases of dinei mamonot? For that matter, with what frequency did women loan each other money in the Mishnaic (or Talmudic) period? One way to answer this question would be to consult the record-books of the batei din. But do any such exist? If my guess, "no," is correct, then why is this the case? Presumably we have more than an inkling of the details of the legislative and juridical activities of the contemporaneous Roman empire. Why then does no listing exist of cases, claimants, and findings for Jewish courts?

I respond:

Quite often our sages add something that seems gratuitous in order to make a point. Such was also my own intention when I wrote "him (or her)". However, Zackary's question indicates that he has misunderstood my intention. Zackary assumed that I was referring to testimony; however, the context should have made it clear that I was referring to litigation. There is no difference whatsoever between the sexes in their Halakhic rights and duties as regards litigation. Women may take a case to court as claimants and may be sued as defendants – and this has nothing to do with the issue of testimony which we discussed about a month ago.

As far as I can tell in Amoraic times women appeared quite naturally in court on business matters. At any rate, there are no statistics about them any more than there are statistics about men appearing in court. However, perhaps it is indicative that Zackary asks his question at the precise place where the Gemara [Sanhedrin 31a] discusses a woman in court! An IOU had been delivered into her safe keeping – perhaps by a business partner – but when it is required as evidence in court she has mislaid it. However, she is adamant that the IOU for which payment is now being claimed, had been paid off. "Rav Naĥman accepted her statement and dismissed the case."

We have now successfully completed our study of the third chapter of Tractate Sanhedrin and next time we can commence our study of the fourth chapter.