דף הביתשיעוריםSanhedrin

Sanhedrin 059

נושא: Sanhedrin




Sanhedrin 059

BET MIDRASH VIRTUALI
of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel


RABIN MISHNAH STUDY GROUP

Bet Midrash Virtuali

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER THREE, MISHNAH SIX (Part 1):
כֵּיצַד בּוֹדְקִים אֶת הָעֵדִים? הָיוּ מַכְנִיסִין אוֹתָן וּמְאַיְּמִין עֲלֵיהֶן וּמוֹצִיאִין אֶת כָּל הָאָדָם לַחוּץ וּמְשַׁיְּרִין אֶת הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּהֶן וְאוֹמְרִים לוֹ, "אֱמוֹר הֵיאַךְ אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁזֶּה חַיָּב לָזֶה". אִם אָמַר, "הוּא אָמַר לִי שֶׁאֲנִי חַיָּב לוֹ", "אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אָמַר לִי שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ", לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר, "בְּפָנֵינוּ הוֹדָה לוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ מָאתַיִם זוּז". וְאַחַר כָּךְ מַכְנִיסִין אֶת הַשֵּׁנִי וּבוֹדְקִים אוֹתוֹ.

How are the witnesses examined? They would bring them in and warn them. Then they send everybody out and leave only the prime witness and ask him to state how he knows that the respondent owes money to the plaintiff. If he replies, "He told me that he owes him money' or "Someone told me that he owes him money" – he has virtually said nothing. For he must be able to say, "In our presence the respondent admitted to the plaintiff that he owed him two hundred dinars". Then they introduce the other witness and examine him.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:
Our present mishnah seeks to describe the procedure in adjudicating Dinei Mamonot [cases involving monetary claims]. Before anything else we note two major differences between what is described in our mishnah and procedure that is familiar to us from Western practice. Firstly, neither the plaintiff nor the respondent (defendant) has to say anything at all. As long as the witnesses have not established the fact of the case (not 'the facts', details, but 'the fact' – that there is a case to be answered) neither of the litigants need address the court at all. We have mentioned on many occasions in the past that the Halakhic system recognizes two kinds of testimony: testimony establishing that "a crime' has been committed, and testimony about the incidental circumstances of the case. [For further details see the shiur of 1st September 1998.] The second major difference is that the witnesses are not 'sworn in'. This is the subject of the Reisha [first section] of our mishnah.

2:
Only under certain very restricted circumstances will a Bet Din administer an oath – and then, it will not be to the witnesses. (Basically, and without going into detail, an oath may be administered to a plaintiff who has no acceptable evidence that the respondent does indeed owe him money, and the judges have the impression that he is, indeed, telling the truth.) In the Western system a witness is required to swear on oath that he will tell the truth. The rabbis saw two very serious drawbacks to such a procedure. Firstly, if someone has decided not to tell the truth, the administering of an oath will not really deter them. But worse, perjury is a sin against one of the Ten Commandments ("You shall not bear false witness…"); if a person perjures himself because the Court required him to take an oath, the Court is in fact making itself an accessory before the fact of the sin. Thus it is that our mishnah requires that the witnesses be 'warned' of the consequences to themselves of committing the sin of perjury – even in a case where the litigant only stands to lose money or property. (The Hebrew term used by our mishnah is, in fact, even stronger than 'warn', and might well be construed as 'threatening' the witnesses.

3:
Even today, the secular courts in Israel recognize the right of all persons appearing before them to refrain from swearing an oath. Other institutions which also require the administration of an oath by law, permit an alternative: soldiers enlisting in the army, members taking up their seats in the Knesset, Presidents entering upon office, Judges upon appointment… In all such cases, it is permitted to refrain from taking an oath and instead to "pledge upon my solemn word of honour".

4:
Probably the most infamous case of perjury related in the Bible is that involved in Naboth's vineyard [1Kings 21]. Naboth [Navot] was a citizen of Shomron whose ancestral property included a vineyard close by the palace of King Aĥ'av [Ahab]. Ahab wanted to acquire the property and to turn it into a vegetable garden. Naboth was not prepared to sell at any price: since the property was ancestral he felt that he was in duty bound to pass it on to his descendants just as he had received it from his ancestors. Ahab sulked, because he realized that he had no way under law to compel Naboth to sell. His wife, Jezebel [Izevel], as a Phoenician princess unlearned in the more democratic ways of Israel, arranged for two witnesses to accuse Naboth of a capital crime. This perjured testimony, of course, secured the conviction and execution of Naboth whose property thus became forfeit to the crown…


5:
The Torah stipulates one very simple rule for the treatment of perjured witnesses:

Should a witness arise prepared to offer false testimony against someone, the two [witnesses] shall stand before God, the priests and the judges that there shall be at that time. The judges shall make a thorough investigation. If it should transpire that the witness has lied against his brother man, you shall do to him what he had conspired to do to his brother… [Deuteronomy 19:16-19]

The Torah thus creates one very simple rule of thumb: someone guilty of perjuring themselves in order to ensure the conviction of a litigant must be punished with whatever punishment the other would have suffered if he had been convicted. Rambam [Maimonides, North Africa, 12th century CE] describes this in sweeping terms (a free translation):

It is a Mitzvah [commandment] to do to the perjured witness whatever he wanted to achieve in his testimony against someone else. If the testimony was offered in a capital case then he shall be executed; if the punishment would have been flogging he shall be flogged; and if the punishment would have been monetary, the sum is divided up equally between all the conspiratorial witnesses. [Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Edut 18:1]

6:
The Gemara [Sanhedrin 29a] discusses the nature of the "warning" that is administered to the witnesses. The Amora Rav Yehudah suggests that a Biblical verse [Proverbs 25:14] is quoted to them, a verse whose midrashic interpretation suggests that perjurers will be plagued by bad weather. The Amora Rava rejects this suggestion since it would hold no terrors for tradespeople, only for agriculturalists. So instead, he suggests a different verse from the same chapter [Proverbs 25:18] whose midrashic interpretation suggests that perjurers will die prematurely. The Amora Rav Ashi rejects this suggestion since most people would quote a proverb that "for the past seven years no one here has died except of old age". Rav Ashi says that the witnesses are warned that "perjurers are held in contempt by everybody" – because when Jezebel arranges for the two "witnesses" to incriminate Naboth she herself refers to them as "worthless men". Obviously, these three Amora'im are not suggesting that these Biblical verses are quoted verbatim to the witnesses, but that the judges must "put the fear of God" into the hearts of the witnesses as regards the fearful consequences of offering false testimony.

To be continued.

DISCUSSION:

In our last shiur I described the mutual duties of the groom and his "shushvin": if Re'uven marries and Shim'on gives him a dinar to help him cover the costs of the wedding festivities [and] if Shim'on subsequently also marries, Re'uven is legally bound to extend to him similar assistance – to the extent that if he does not do so Shim'on may take Re'uven to court to get his money…"

Rick Dinitz writes:

It sounds as though the em>shushvin would have a presumptive "material interest" in any monetary case involving the ĥatan. It's almost as though the shushvin is a kind of creditor. For example, Shim'on may want to ensure that Re'uven has enough money to return the dinar when Shim'on marries, so he might be inclined (perhaps subconciously) to judge in Re'uven's favor. This impediment would certainly last longer than the seven days of wedding festivities; indeed, it could last until Re'uven reciprocates. And the goodwill that flows from this mutual aid relationship could last indefinitely.

I respond:

All this is true. What I did not mention in the shiur (for the sake of brevity) is that according to many Poskim [decisors] Shim'on's liability is very restricted to exact parallel circumstances. Rambam, from whom the above quote came, speaks of Re'uven undertaking a second marriage and Shim'on loaning him a dinar; thus Re'uven would only be required to act similarly towards Shim'on if Shim'on undertakes a second marriage and to no more than the sum that Shim'on had originally given him.

By the way, perhaps it would not be out of order to point out here that anyone invited to a wedding celebration is a kind of "Shushvin", and that they are Halakhically required to provide a present for the couple getting married, as a kind of reimbursement for the expenses involved in arranging the wedding feast, so that the couple will not start out their life together with expenses incurred.

Ĥag Same'aĥ to everybody.




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