דף הביתשיעוריםSanhedrin

Sanhedrin 056

נושא: Sanhedrin




Sanhedrin 056

BET MIDRASH VIRTUALI
of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel


RABIN MISHNAH STUDY GROUP

Bet Midrash Virtuali

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER THREE, MISHNAH FOUR (recap):
וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הַקְּרוֹבִין: אָבִיו וְאָחִיו וַאֲחִי אָבִיו וַאֲחִי אִמּוֹ וּבַעַל אֲחוֹתוֹ וּבַעַל אֲחוֹת אָבִיו וּבַעַל אֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ וּבַעַל אִמּוֹ וְחָמִיו וְגִיסוֹ, הֵן וּבְנֵיהֶן וְחַתְנֵיהֶן, וְחוֹרְגוֹ לְבַדּוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: זוֹ מִשְׁנַת רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא; אֲבָל מִשְׁנָה רִאשׁוֹנָה, דוֹדוֹ וּבֶן דּוֹדוֹ. וְכָל הָרָאוּי לְיָרְשׁוֹ, וְכָל הַקָּרוֹב לוֹ בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה. הָיָה קָרוֹב וְנִתְרַחֵק, הֲרֵי זֶה כָּשֵׁר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֲפִלּוּ מֵתָה בִתּוֹ וְיֶשׁ לוֹ בָנִים מִמֶּנָּה, הֲרֵי זֶה קָרוֹב:

The following are considered to be related: father, brother, paternal uncle, maternal uncle, brother-in-law, paternal uncle-by-marriage, maternal uncle-by-marriage, step-father, father-in-law, brother-in-law. In addition to the above are included their natural sons and their sons-in-law. Also one's step-son (but not his increase) –

(Rabbi Yosé says that the above is Rabbi Akiva's mishnah; but the original mishnah read: uncle, cousin, and anyone else in line of succession.) –

– and anyone related to him at the time. Someone who had been related but is not now related is qualified. Rabbi Yehudah says that even his grandsons from his deceased daughter are considered relatives.

DISCUSSION (continued):

Quite a backlog of questions and comments has been generated by our discussion on women as witnesses, so we shall devote this shiur entirely to discussion in order to reduce the backlog.

Zackary Berger writes:

I learned from Judith Hauptmann's "Rereading the Rabbis" that women are allowed to testify for other women according to BT Gittin. If this is so, how can the gezerah shavah you referred to have any standing at all?

I respond:

It is most gratifying to know that there are people "out there" reading and studying Professor Hauptman's book. As far as I am aware, what we have established so far and, hopefully, what we shall yet say does not contradict Professor Hauptman's conclusions. We have said as clearly as we may that the Gezerah Shavah which serves as the basis for the legislation of the sages against women testifying seems to be an attempt to justify a conclusion already reached. But that does not mean that for the sages propounding the Gezerah Shavah it cannot stand. Professor Hauptman suggests a line of thought that underpins all the actions of the sages in connection with women. In RMSG we have mentioned this line of thought on several occasions in the past, in a different context. On 2nd January 1997 I gave the following extensive explanation (here drastically edited). It was concerned with the fact that the sages saw women as "excused" certain mitzvot, but it is equally applicable to our present discussion.

Why are the persons mentioned in our mishnah excused? What do the sages see "women, slaves and children" as having in common that they are bracketed together? If the women were not on the list it would be easier for us, today, to intuitively understand the common characteristic. If, for instance, the list were to read "children, soldiers on active service and persons incarcerated in a state penitentiary" [are excused] it would be easier for us to spot the common characteristic (as perceived by the sages). None of these persons are "masters of their own fate". The Talmud [Kiddushin 30b] quotes from the Midrash Halakhah called "Sifra". Let us try and follow the discussion. The Torah, in Leviticus 19:3, rules: "Let each man respect his mother and father". Despite the fact that the Torah refers to "each man" the sages ruled that "sometimes" women also were obligated by this command. The inclusion of daughters in the command to respect parents is based on the fact that the verb ["respect"] in Hebrew is in the plural. That being the case, the Sifra asks, Why does the verse start with the noun 'man' [ish]? The answer given is now easy for us to understand (even if it is almost impossible to swallow): A man is always a free agent to do his parents' bidding, whereas a woman [i.e. wife] is not such a free agent because someone else has tutelary rights over her. [Ish – sipek be-yado la'asot, ishah eyn sipek be-yadah la'asot mipney she-reshut acherim aleha.] Much ink has been needlessly spilled in trying to "smooth over the rough edges" of this midrash. The most ubiquitous "resolution" of the dilemma is to explain that a married woman is not a free agent because of her duties to her household and her children. This is a red herring. We must face the fact that, for the sages, women – however much they were loved and respected – were not considered part of general society. This was not always the case and is not now the case, but it was the case in Talmudic times. It seems reasonable to assume that the subordinate situation of the woman in rabbinic literature reflects a general social situation. There were obviously shining exceptions, but as a rule women were lacking in education and public social standing. The sociology of the situation is, in my opinion, outside the scope of our study: I only state what seems to be an objective description of an historical situation.

This kind of rationale is transferred by Professor Hauptman to the topic of our present discussion:

Women, although reliable in and of themselves, could not testify in most civil and criminal cases because, when married, they were beholden to their husbands and likely to be influenced by them in how they reported what they saw. That is, a woman could not testify because her subordinate status was likely to compromise her ability to tell the truth. Women as women were reliable. However, when they found themselves under the control of men, as wives necessarily would, they were not free to tell the truth. Another consequence of their subordinate status was that they could not testify in cases concerning men, their superiors, lest they compromise men's dignity." [Judith Hauptman, Rereading the Rabbis, A woman's Voice, 1998, page 197.]

We move on to the next item. In our last shiur I wrote that women as testifiers seems to be an issue that splits the Conservative rabbinate right down the middle. When this issue was discussed at the Convention of the Rabbinical Assembly as recently as 1992, the voting was 53 for granting "Gender Equality in Halakhah" while 50 were opposed.

Ron Kaminsky writes:

You have not given me enough information to be sure, but it seems to me that "Gender Equality in Halakhah" is a much broader question than just the question of gender equality with respect to testimony, i.e., that perhaps much more than 50% of the Rabbinical Assembly would have voted in favor of gender equality in testimony as an issue by itself, and the vote came out the way it did because of other issues such as whether women can be "Shliĥot Tzibur".

I respond:

My hunch is that the situation is the opposite of what Ron is suggesting. Of course, "Gender Equality" is a much broader topic, but I suspect that by now the overwhelming majority of Conservative rabbis have no problem (Halakhic or emotional) with women serving in ritual capacities; but they are "split down the middle" on the question of the admissibility of women serving as testifiers to the fact [Eidey Kiyyum]. The hesitation of that half that says nay is probably caused by the consequences for the Jewish world as a whole, rather than the strict Halakhic consideration. Let me interpolate here part of a message sent by Robert Kaiser:

A 1974 minority opinion of the Committee for Jewish Law and Standards [of the Rabbinical Assembly in America] already does allow for this [women serving as testifiers to the fact]. Since 1974 Conservative rabbis have had the option of allowing women to act as witnesses. A few have taken the liberty of acting on this. How did they do so? Through a halakhic similar to the one that you described. Your argument [drawing a distinction between women in the past and the 'new' woman of today] does go a bit beyond theirs, and greatly strengthens it… I find your thoughts both halakhically sound as well as being in the spirit of what Conservative Judaism stands for. Both rabbis and laity will only benefit by being exposed to such halakhic reasoning.

The reason why I quote this is not for the kudos, but to point out that even though Conservative rabbis have had the option mentioned by Robert, even as late as fourteen years later it was an issue that still split the Conservative rabbinate "right down the middle".


And yet another item. I wrote that What my suggestion means is that the social status of the modern woman is so changed [she] is not "a woman" as understood by the rabbis.

This causes concern to Barry Frieslander:

Surely, we could apply that philosophy to all aspects of Jewish society and in doing so question the validity of both the Tanach and the Talmud in today's day and age?

Yes, Barry, that is exactly the case – and always has been! The essence of rabbinic Judaism (Orthodox and Conservative alike) is that we do not observe the Torah as written: we observe the Torah as understood and as interpreted by the sages. That is the very heart of the concept of Midrash. And the whole history of the development of Halakhah demonstrates that at no time did the greatest authorities refrain from "re-interpreting" the law as understood heretofore when they considered that the circumstances had changed sufficiently to warrant the departure. Often Poskim [decisors] have to ask themselves how to understand a verse of the Torah. For example, the great debate concerning the admissibility or otherwise of turning on an electric light on Shabbat – not, please note, the admissibility of the use of electricity, which is admitted even by the Ultra-Orthodox – devolves upon the question whether the electric light bulb and the current serving it can truly be subsumed under the category of "fire" which is explicitly prohibited by the Torah. Anyone who knows how electricity was generated one hundred years ago knows that it involved many actions that contravened basic Halakhah ("burning", "cooking" etc). That did not stop the greatest of the rabbis of the time from permitting the use of electricity on Shabbat. It would seem that truly, "where there is a rabbinic will there is a Halakhic way".


Today I depart from two golden rules that I have observed on RMSG since its inception. Firstly, today's shiur is overly long and I am now going to make it even longer! Secondly: I receive a large amount of mail praising RMSG, my contribution to teaching Judaism and the manner in which I do it. I always edit such encomia out of the messages I quote (for reasons of humility), but today I have already included one encomium and now am going to include another. I just don't know how to edit them out without destroying the fabric of what the authors want to say.

Robin Friedman has sent a long message, but I quote it in its entirety, because it seems to be saying the opposite of what was implied in the previous message. While I might have phrased some of Robin's comments slightly differently I pass them on without comment.

As always, I find your lessons illuminating and refreshing in their learning and their candour. The study with you is the only connection I have with organized Judaism at the present. I have a few questions/comments on your discussion of women as witnesses.

  1. In part the discussion has an archaic tone. I think this way in part for reasons suggested by your earlier lessons in which you state, correctly in my view, that revelation is a human phenomenon, an expression of the means by which (in Judaism) the Jewish people have sought for God. (This approach nicely covers Christians and other non-Jews in the sense that their revelations document the sense in which they have sought for God. This is one of the things that, as I am sure you realize, make your position attractive.) I realize that this observation does not by itself compel any specific position on whether women should be accepted as witnesses. It might affect, however, the perspective we bring to the question.
  2. I appreciate your reference to Napoleon (a good choice to use!) and your analogies to the situation with intermarriage to Moabite converts, etc. Do these analogies not prove too much? (i.e. why differentiate between Kosher and non-Kosher food, say, when with the way the world is everything has run together and become indistinguishable?
  3. I think what the analogy to the Moabites shows is that there have to be human and spiritual reasons for people to make the decisions they make. There was a perceived discomfort with a rule excluding Moabite converts. At least some portions of the community, of which oddly enough I am one, don't feel the same about women's issues. Regardless of decisions that the larger secular society may make, there is a feeling that sexuality is a deep portion of spiritual/human life and that religious roles may properly reflect sex-based differences. Thus, I am always a bit put off as seeing sex-based rules in Judaism, or elsewhere for that matter, as "problems" to be hermeneutically resolved. I am also put off badly by efforts by some traditional Jews to use every bit of ingenuity to evade sex based rules while trying to maintain tradition intact for everything else. There are times when religious life, of which I am admittedly not a part, may be different from secular life, and I think recognizing the importance of gender based roles is one of these times. So, those disagreeing with critics of "sexism" etc do so less because of some difference in applying hermeneutical rules, in my opinion, and more because of a feeling that an important value is at stake here, as there is not in the case of marriage with the Moabite convert, and as there would be for the traditional Jewish community if it adopted my remarks on Kosher food.

Anyway, as I said I appreciate having the opportunity of studying with you and sharing your wisdom.

Discussion on this topic is now (firmly) closed, and in our next shiur we shall resume our study of the mishnah at hand.

Shabbat Shalom to everybody.




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