Eretz-Israel 010

54:
We have seen how the sages in Babylon permitted themselves to adjudicate cases involving matters of money with judicial impunity by receiving a licence from the exilarch. According to halakhic jurisprudence if someone adjudicates a case between two parties – one suing the other – and the case involves money the adjudicator (judge) is not immune from the consequences of error. If he makes a mistake in judgement which is later discovered he is required to make restitution to the imjured party from his own pocket! By way of illustration let us review an incident recorded in the Gemara [Sanhedrin 33a].

On one occasion the following question came before Rabbi Tarfon [Eretz-Israel, beginning of 2nd century CE]: could the meat from a cow that had been ritually slaughtered be considered kosher if the cow's womb had been removed during its lifetime? Rabbi Tarfon obviously considered that no cow could survive for long after such an operation, and therefore determined that the meat should be "cast to the dogs" [Exodus 22:30], since the cow was 'dying' at the moment of slaughter. The owner of the cow (who presumably had hoped to make a fine profit, appealed to the sages of the Sanhedrin assembled in Yavneh. Todos the physician reported to the assembly that no cow or pig could be exported from Alexandria [in Egypt] unless its womb had first been removed – so that it could not subsequently give birth. (This was a measure to protect the rarity of these animals of superior quality, so that they could not be bred outside Egypt and so that their value would remain high.) This evidence obviously indicated that Rabbi Tarfon had been wrong in his assumption that the cow in question could not have survived the hysterectomy; this, in turn meant that the meat that Rabbi Tarfon had "fed to the dogs" was kosher, after all. Rabbi Tarfon immediately recognized his mistake with the rueful remark, "There goes your donkey, Tarfon!" – meaning that he would have to sell his donkey in order to compensate the owner of the cow out of his own pocket. A young student of his, later to be come the eternally renowned Rabbi Akiva, told him not to worry: he need not compensate the owner of the cow since he – Tarfon – was a mumḥeh la-rabbim [a publicly recognized specialist].

55:
One became a mumḥeh la-rabbim by receiving a licence from the president of the Sanhedrin, and the preseidents took great care not to let this status leave Eretz-Israel. Thus the sages in Babylon had to find a "replacement". We saw in the previous shiur how they equated the Exilarch in Babylon with the President of the Sanhedrin in Eretz-Israel. Indeed, they even claimed that the Exilarch was superior to the President, as we saw in the previous shiur.

56:
After having established this principle the Gemara [Sanhedrin 5a-b] proceeds to examine the issue of the licence. It asks

The question clearly seeks to understand upon what criteria it was issued and not the nature of the paper on which it was written. (Actually, it may not have been written at all, but the licence may have been given verbally.) Instead of responding to its own question the Gemara recounts an incident:

Even though it is not directly relevant to our present discussion the last question of Rabbi Ḥiyya requires a brief explanation. The Torah [Exodus 34:19-20] commands as follows:

The basic idea is that the firstborn male of an animal that could be offered ("cattle or sheep") was to be sacrificed on the altar in the Bet Mikdash. Donkeys, like human beings, could not be sacrificed on the altar. Therefore donkeys, like human beings, must be redeemed. (You can watch a ceremony of A Donkey's Redemption that took place in 2007 in Moshav Elyashiv in Israel.) But cattle or sheep could not be redeemed. When the Bet Mikdash was still functioning these animals would be slaughtered and offered on the altar. However, in post-temple times such animals could not be slaughtered at all. This, of course, involved considerable monetary loss to the farmer. So, often a farmer would bring to a sage a firstborn lamb or calf in the hope that the sage would find some defect in the animal that would qualify it for secular slaughter after all (because the defect would have disqualified it for sacrifice had the Bet Mikdash still been functioning). In the incident which the Gemara describes Rabbi licences Rabba bar-Ḥanna to perform all three judicatory functions.

57:
In that same incident the Gemara now recounts a second incident:

So we see that in some cases the licence was not given. Rabba bar-Ḥanna was the son of Rabbi Ḥiyya's brother, while Rav was the son of his sister. As is well known, Rav, after returning to Babylon, became one of the greatest of the Babylonian sages of all time. It was he who established the great yeshiva in Sura where the first seeds of the Babylonian Talmud were planted. Rav was so famous that the Gemara now turns summersaults to try and explain why Rabbi denied this greatest of sages the right to adjudicate in the matter of firstborn animals. Two answers are offered (both arouse some incredulity):

1. Rav was so great an expert that he might have permitted animals in cases where others could not see the defect and they would thereafter perpetuate errors;
2. Rav was so outstanding a student that Rabbi felt that he had to show some additional honour to Rav's cousin, Rabba bar-Ḥanna.

58:
Let us conclude our study of this topic with a curiosity. We recall that conversation between Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi, the President of the Sanhedrin. You will note that I had to add lot of explanatory notes. In the original version in the Gemara the conversation reads something like this:

May he teach? He may teach. May he adjudicate? He may adjudicate. May he permit? He may not permit!

In fact, in the original the whole conversation consists of six words! It has become customary in orthodox Judaism to use the two words Yoreh Yoreh [He may teach halakhah] as the heart of the document of semikhah, ordination. And, if the musmakh studies further and is deemed worthy of being a dayyan in a Bet Din [court of law] the next two words are used: Yadin Yadin [He may judge].

Thus the primacy of the sages of Eretz-Israel was rendered void by the sages of the Babylonian diaspora. And this concludes our study of this topic.

Having concluded our topic I am now going to take a break. I shall be undergoing treatment for a condition that I have and this is liable to sap my strength (in order ultimately to restore my strength). I shall devote what strength I have to continue the shiurim in Mishnah and will return the another halakhic topic when I shall have recovered, in a few weeks time. In the mean time please send me emails with your suggestions as to what the next topic in the Halakhah Study Group should be.