Bava Kamma 101

1:
There are two clauses in our present mishnah, and they both treat more or less of the same issue: to what extent am I required to reimburse someone who has saved my property while losing his own in doing so.

2:
Two people are coming along the same road; one is carrying a cask of wine and the other is carrying a jar of honey. Let's not get into issues of amounts of produce and so on; we must assume that the honey is worth more than the wine. For some reason or other, which our mishnah does not specify, the jar containing the honey is so damaged that all the honey spills out from it. Perhaps the intention of our mishnah is to imply an accident in which the two people collide with each other. Realizing the greater loss of the owner of the honey, the owner of the wine graciously pours out his wine onto the road and scoops the honey into his now empty cask.

3:
We would imagine that the owner of the honey would be so pleased that his produce has been saved that he would offer the compensate the owner of the wine for the loss he has sustained. If he does so he is acting beyond the requirement of the law. For halakhah states that the owner of the wine is not entitled to any compensation for the loss of his wine. No one asked him to do what he did: his loss was because of his own action – noble as it may have been. He is, however, entitled to be paid for his trouble, at the going rate for a day-labourer; the owner of the honey must also pay for the cask itself, which is now his.

4:
However, if the owner of the wine had suggested to the owner of the honey that he save his honey for him on the condition of reimbursement then the owner of the honey must make good the loss of the owner of the wine. A necessary assumption, which is not actually specified by our mishnah, is, of course, that the owner of the honey responded, "OK" or some such acceptance.

5:
We now come to the second of the two clauses of our mishnah. This time, the scenario offered concerns not produce but livestock. David and Joel are crossing a wadi in the Negev. A sudden torrential rainstorm fills the wadi with raging water. The stream is so powerful that both David's donkey and Joel's donkey are struggling. (These sudden torrents of water are sometimes so powerful that today even large trucks are stranded mid-stream when the driver is foolish enough to try and cross.) David's animal is greatly superior to that belonging to Joel. Our mishnah says that the one is worth two hundred dinars while the other is worth only one hundred dinars (a maneh, a talent).

6:
Joel lets go of the reins of his animal in order to save David's animal, which is worth more. Joel's donkey is carried away by the surging waters and is lost. Here again, we would imagine that David would be so pleased that his animal has been saved that he would offer the compensate Joel for the loss of his donkey. After all, Joel has saved two hundred dinars for David at the loss of one hundred dinars of his own. However, if Joel does so he is acting beyond the requirement of the law. For halakhah states that he is not entitled to any compensation. David did not ask Joel to do what he did: his loss was because of his own action – noble as it may have been. Here again, David must pay Joel for the trouble he took, at the going rate for a day-labourer.

7:
However, if Joel had shouted out to David that he will save his donkey him if he will make good to him his loss of his donkey then David must reimburse Joel with the one hundred dinars that he has lost. Again, a necessary assumption, which is not actually specified by our mishnah, is, of course, that David responded, "Yes, please do" or some such acceptance.

The first three mishnahs of Chapter Ten have presented a situation in which people, unwittingly, benefit from stolen property. Howard Schwartz here offers a comparison with US law.

I find it interesting that the law in the US (I don't know about Israel) is quite different. Here, if a person receives, including through purchase, stolen property, even if they believe it to be an "arms' length transaction", the property would be confiscated without compensation and returned to the original owner. It doesn't matter whether the person receiving the property knows it is stolen or not. For people in the business of buying goods, such as pawnbrokers or art galleries, this is a big deal, and they go through rigorous lengths to make sure the property is not stolen. I am not clear why the Rabbis felt people who received stolen property should be compensated, particularly if the theft was publicized, as the Mishnah implies [BK 100]. It seems to me that, in your example, it would make more sense for Sarah to sue the thief, not David, as David could be made whole simply by the return of his property. The mishnah in effect, is rewarding people who receive stolen goods (in US parlance, a "fence"), because they would ostensibly make money if the victim doesn't reclaim the goods, and break even if the victim prevails in court.

I respond:

I appreciate Howard's point. Then same thought also crossed my mind. But we must remember that in our scenario Sarah is not a "fence": she had no idea that the book had been stolen; she bought it off a pedlar. (She certainly would not have at her disposal any means of investigation or detection concerning the legality of her purchase, even if such a thought had entered her head.) When we reach Mishnah 9 in this chapter we shall see that there were situations in which a purchaser should be careful not to receive stolen goods, but in Sarah's case she has no reason to be wary. Both David and Sarah sustained a loss: I would imagine that the sages asked themselves why Sarah should have to sustain her loss rather than David sustain his?