Bava Kamma 024

of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel

RABIN MISHNAH STUDY GROUP

TRACTATE BAVA KAMMA, CHAPTER THREE, MISHNAH NINE:
If an ox worth one talent gores an ox worth two hundred but the carcass is worthless he takes the ox. If an ox worth two hundred gores an ox worth two hundred but the carcass is worthless – Rabbi Me'ir says that such a case is referred to [in the Torah]: "They shall sell the live ox and divide the money" [Exodus 21:35]. Rabbi Yehudah said to him, "That is halakhah; [however,] you have fulfilled [the command] 'They shall sell the live ox and divide the money' but you have not fulfilled [the command] 'And also the dead [ox] shall they divide [between them].' To what does this refer? – this refers to an ox worth two hundred that gores an ox worth two hundred and the carcass is worth fifty dinars. [In such a case] each takes half the live [ox] and half the dead [ox]."
EXPLANATIONS:
1:
The biblical source for our present mishnah is to be found in Exodus 21:35:
When a man's ox injures his neighbour's ox and it dies, they shall sell the live ox and divide its price; they shall also divide the dead animal.
2:
The basic unit of currency in mishnaic times was the dinar, which obviously was based on the value of the Roman denarius. (An artisan could expect to earn three or four dinars for a day's work.) The dinar was also called a zuz. One hundred dinars constituted a talent, maneh in Hebrew.
3:
The first clause of our mishnah deals with a case where an ox worth one hundred dinars gores to death another ox worth two hundred dinars. The ox that gored enjoyed the status of 'docile', which means that the owner only has to pay half-damages. The Torah says "they shall also divide the dead animal", but our mishnah is concerned with a situation in which the carcass is worth nothing at all. In such circumstances the owner of the dead ox takes the live ox as payment for his loss, and since only half-damages were due the value of the surviving ox (100 dinars) covers half his loss.
4:
The second case offered by our mishnah is almost the same as the first case except that now both oxen have the same value (200 dinars). Rabbi Me'ir holds that such is the situation which is referred to in the verse of the Torah that we have quoted above:
When a man's ox injures his neighbour's ox and it dies, they shall sell the live ox and divide its price.
5:
However, Rabbi Yehudah points out that the attribution suggested by Rabbi Me'ir is incomplete. He tells his colleague that what he has said is, indeed, halakhah – but he has not explained the verse correctly! Where, in the explanation of Rabbi Me'ir, is the provision of the Torah that "they shall also divide the dead animal"?
6:
Rabbi Yehudah now suggests that the biblical verse is referring to a situation in which the carcass of the dead animal is not worthless. Let's say that it is worth 50 dinars. So, they sell the live ox for 200 dinars and the dead ox for 50 dinars, a total of 250 dinars.
7:
David has an ox worth two hundred dinars which has hitherto enjoyed the status of 'tam', docile. However, one day David's ox gores to death an ox belonging to Sarah. Sarah's ox was also worth two hundred dinars, though now the carcass is worth only 50 dinars. Since David's ox was 'docile' he must compensate her by payment of 75 dinars. If they sell the two oxen for 250 dinars and divide the money between them both receive 125 dinars. Thus David has lost 75 dinars (which is what he owes Sarah).
DISCUSSION:
In BK 020 I responded to a question posed by Tamar Dar. In my response I wrote:
We have noted on several occasions that people have the right to use the public domain for their purposes. This is why we established right at the beginning of this chapter that people must look where they are going when they cross the public domain.
Two people reprimand me (most politely) for an egregious error. Ed Spitz writes:
I don't understand your answer to Tamar Dar's question about obstacles in the public domain. I thought we learned in previous sessions that everyone has the right to walk in the public domain without looking carefully where he is going. And, therefore, the person who leaves an obstacle in the public domain is responsible for any damage caused to another person, because we all have the right to walk in the public domain, without looking carefully where we go.
And Amnon Ron'el spotted my mistake as well:
Your response to Tamar seems to me to be contradicting what you wrote in BK018, paragraph 2.
Almost nothing gives a teacher a greater pleasure when those learning with him or her demonstrate their understanding by pointing out an error. Yes, we did indeed establish that pedestrians do not have to look where they are going in the public domain. My sentence should have read "This is why we established right at the beginning of this chapter that people need not look where they are going when they cross the public domain."
To remove all doubt, the answer to Tamar's question is unchanged: anyone who leaves a hazard in the public domain in unusual circumstances can be sued for damages caused.
This topic is now closed.

