Berakhot 158

So far in this excursus we have noted that Rambam creates three categories for perceived evils (or suffering): suffering that is the result of our being alive in this universe; suffering that people bring upon themselves; and suffering that is caused by other human beings. We have already discussed the first two categories, and we can now proceed to the third.

The overwhelming majority of the suffering that there is in this world is caused by what human beings do to other human beings. Sometimes the action is unintentional, but the suffering that it can bring about is immeasurable. When an inebriated driver knocks down an innocent pedestrian she did not intend to cause harm; but harm ensues: bodily harm, possibly even death. The sole reason for the pedestrian's plight is the unthinking and unintentional mayhem inflicted by the reckless driver. The fact that the deed was unthinking and unintentional ("But I didn't mean to do it") in no way reduces the driver's responsibility and culpability. Three of the Mishnah's most studied tractates (Bava Kama, Bava Metzi'a and Bava Batra) are devoted to what Western jurisprudence would call "torts" – damages claimed as the result of someone else's actions towards you.

One of the main Torah bases concerning our responsibility is to be found in Exodus 21:28-32. Basing itself upon the stipulation of the Written Torah that people are responsible for the actions of animals in their charge, the Unwritten Torah enlarges upon this: not only are we responsible for the actions of our animals, but we are responsible for damage caused by anything in our charge. The above-mention "Law of the Ox" differentiates between culpability for a "first-time offender" (where the owner only pays half-damages, because he may not have known that his animal might cause damage) and the culpability of an owner whose animal has already "been in court" – "warned" is the term used by the Torah (verse 29). I mention all this in order to make one point: Torah Law does not view human beings like the rest of the animal world. A human being who causes damage can never claim that "this is only the first time": Adam le'olam mu'ad [a human being is always considered as having been "warned"]. The action of our reckless driver may not have been intentional, but she must be held to be aware of the possibility that she could cause harm to others (or their property) and calculate her behaviour accordingly. Who was responsible for the suffering of the innocent pedestrian? – the driver or God? Obviously it was the driver.

But human suffering at the hands of other human beings can be almost infinitely multiplied – and the Jewish people have six million reasons this century alone for knowing this to be the case. And when we talk of the Holocaust inevitably the question will be raised in some form or other – "Why did God let it happen?". While people would consent to the sole culpability of the reckless driver, they would require Divine intervention to prevent a holocaust. Yet, if we follow the logic of Jewish philosophy and take it to its logical conclusion, we would understand that God will not intervene to prevent one or more human beings causing harm to one, a hundred, a thousand, a million, six million other human beings.

We already hinted at this in our last shiur. Man is a creature endowed with free will. We are not automatons, programmed to perform only in accord with the designs of our Manufacturer. Rambam points out at the very beginning of his Guide for the Perplexed [1:2] that if man did not have free will there would be no point in the whole of the Torah and its mitzvot. If we were programmed to do only good there would be no reason to warn us not to do wrong. (There is no point in telling a creature 'Thou shalt not steal' if that creature is constitutionally incapable of stealing.) Free will means that we can decide for ourselves how we will act: the Torah can only prescribe and warn. At the very end of his career Moses pleads with his flock (in God's name) along these lines [Deuteronomy 30:11-20]:

The fact that we have free will, to choose whether to obey or not, means that we have been granted the capability of doing enormous good and immense harm. We can find a cure for cancer or we can blow ourselves to bits: it's entirely up to us. But in order for free will to work God has to set a limit to Divine power: if we are to be free agents morally, God may not intervene and deprive us of that capability at will. The Babylonian Amora, Rabbi Ĥanina, put this at its most succinct [Berakhot 33b]:

In other words, God has removed human behaviour from the sphere of Divine control and influence. Rabbi Ĥanina bases his observation of a verse different from the one we have quoted, but equally effective [Deuteronomy 10:12].

To be continued.