Avot231

Today's shiur is dedicated by Steven C. Spronz
in memory of his father, Richard Spronz,
Yehuda ben Moshe Zvi v'Sara Leah z"l
whose Yahrzeit was yesterday, 7th Marcheshvan.

13:
We should now turn our attention to the question of how it came about that communal rabbis permit themselves to be paid for their Torah services and Yeshivah students permi themselves to devote themselves to study and rely on charity.

14:
It seems to me that if the custom did not start with Rabbi Shim'on ben-Zemaĥ Duran the phenomenon is certainly illustrated by the events of his life.

Rabbi Shim'on ben-Zemaĥ Duran, known by his sobriquet Tashbetz was born in 1361 on the Spanish island of Majorca. He died in 1444. As well as his rabbinic studies he was also a student of philosophy, astronomy, mathematics, and especially of medicine, which he practised for a number of years in Palma. After a persecution of the Jews in 1391 he moved to Algiers, where he practised medicine. When the chief Rabbi of Algiers, Rabbi Yitzĥak ben-Sheshet, died Rabbi Shim'on Duran was chosen as chief rabbi As Duran had lost all his property during the massacre in Majorca, he was forced against his will to accept payment from the community. The arrangement was that he would continue practising medicine but that the community would reimburse him for any time he lost at his practice as a result of his work for the community. In this he was basing himself upon a very well-founded precedent in the Talmud.

In other words, it is forbidden for a Dayyan in a rabbinical court [Bet Din] to accept payment [from the litigants], because if he did so he would be deriving material benefit from Torah. The Gemara [Ketubot 105a] notes that taking money from litigants in cases of Dinei Mamonot [Civil cases] would also lay the judge open to the temptation of bribery. However, the Gemara then goes on to cite a baraita:

From this it might seem that, however much it is to be deprecated, if a judge does accept payment for rendering a decision it is valid – and this, of course, contradicts the mishnah. In the subsequent discussion in the Gemara it is determined that the mishnah is referring to simple payment, whereas the baraita is referring to reimbursement for lost income (and the judge is 'ugly' when he cannot prove his loss of income). A concrete example is offered:

16:
It thus becomes clear that reimbursement for lost income is not considered to be deriving material benefit from Torah; and this was the arrangement that was applied in the case of Rabbi Shim'on Duran: he would continue his medical practice, but the community would reimburse him for lost time [Sekhar Battala].

17:
This seems to be the origin of payment for rabbinical services rendered. Since most congregations want their rabbi to work full time on their behalf they have to reimburse him for his lost income totally. One can see how such an arrangement came into easy abuse. Happy the rabbi part of whose income is earned from a secular profession and the remainder made up as reimbursement for time spent away from gainful employment.

18:
It remains for us to relate to the rather enigmatic term used in our mishnah, when quoting Hillel: 'ephemeral'. The original Aramaic term bears the connotation of change, passing away. The meaning in our present context clearly is that anyone who makes profane use, for personal profit, of their knowledge of Torah is endangering their spiritual existence. When this clause of our present mishnah is quoted in the post-canonical Tractate Kallah [chapter 1] it is rendered thus: