18:
Where there are no men strive to be a man: to my mind this is, perhaps, one of the most elevated teachings of the whole of this tractate. In order to fully appreciate the meaning of this sentence we need to explicate two words: 'man' and 'strive'.
19:
In Hebrew there are two words which generally speaking serve to indicate 'man': one is adam and the other is ish. The term adam serves to indicate the species – the human race in general or each human being in particular. In his monumental work of rabbinic philosophy, the Guide for the Perplexed [part 1, chapter 14] Rambam defines adam as being homonymous; that is to say that it serves to indicate more than one thing and its particular meaning must be gleaned from its context:
Rambam's last comment above is most important for our present discussion, because he hints that the Hebrew word
ish (man) is often used to distinguish 'superior' members of the human race or something 'superior' about a human being.
20:
The Hebrew term used in our mishnah for the word 'strive' is hishtadel. This is a word borrowed from cognate Semitic languages, and its essential meaning can be ascertained when we view its use in other contexts. Well known is the story in the Torah [Genesis 32:24] how Jacob wrestled with an angel. Onkelos (2nd century CE) translates the Hebrew 'wrestled' into Aramaic as ishtadal. (And please note that in the Hebrew text the word ish is used to designate Jacob's opponent.)
21:
We can now put the two terms together: in a place where there are no 'superior' people – with developed ethical principles and moral sensitivity – you must wrestle with yourself to be such a person. I can't help thinking that Jacob, during that lonely and fearful night on the banks of the Jabbok, wrestled not with an angel but with his ish – the superior part of his moral makeup. He had wronged his brother and now he forced himself to admit his wrongdoing: he wrestled with his ish and was transformed into "Israel".
To be continued.
There is an appalling backlog of your comments and queries, and I shall try to reduce that backlog over the next few shiurim. In Avot 106 I mentioned that in Judaism, as in most legal systems, "ignorance of the law is no excuse". In his comment below
Jacob Chinitz uses Hebrew terms that should be clarified:
Meizid refers to someone who deliberately and knowingly contravenes a law, while
Shogeg refers to someone who inadvertently contravened a law. He writes:
Is there not a fundamental difference between Torah law and secular law with regard to "ignorance of the law?" While it is correct as you point out that ignorance of Torah is no excuse because of the obligation of Talmud Torah, is it not true that with respect to sin the ignorance of the law removes the sinner from the category of Meizid and puts him in the category of Shogeg, involving sacrifice rather than full punishment for transgression of the law? True, in the case of murder he could not claim he did not know it was forbidden, as Cain could not plead innocence because of the very absence of a law against murder. But he who forgets it is Shabbat, or forgets that this particular work is forbidden on Shabbat, is considered a Shogeg and brings an offering. Whereas in secular law, ignorance of the law does not prevent prosecution and punishment, only perhaps as a mitigating factor in the extent of the punishment.
I respond:
I think that Jacob fails here to distinguish between the ideal philosophic concept and the practical application of law. Ideally, every single one of us should know the law and study it; but the person who fails in this regard might be classed as a 'sinner' but is not legally culpable. When the law lays down punishments that may be imposed by human courts for transgression of the law it is imperative that we distinguish between deliberate transgression and inadvertent transgression. Someone who neglects "Talmud Torah" might possibly be classed as a 'religious failure' but legally they are certainly not culpable.
