4:
We must now ask ourselves what can be the intended difference between an 'ignoramus' and a 'fool' on the one hand, and on the other what the semantic difference is between one who is 'sin-fearing' and one who is 'pious'.
5:
In our present context we have already defined the ignoramus as being one who is ignorant of the mitzvot, someone who cannot observe the laws of the Torah because he or she does not know them or has never bothered to learn them. Not only can such a person not be pious: by definition they cannot even be sin-fearing. It seems logical, therefore, to assume that the 'fool' is someone who does have some knowledge of the mitzvot but does not observe some or all of them. The Hebrew term which I have rendered 'fool' is "Am ha-Aretz". We have had occasion many times over the years to mention the "Am ha-Aretz" and to explain who he was. The remotest origin of the term is probably to be sought in the era in which the exiles who had been in Babylon returned home to Eretz-Israel in the 6th century BCE. When we studied Kiddushin 4:1 I wrote [July 30th 1996]:
In the society that these "Returnees" established in Judah, the "in people" were those who had been through the experience of Exile; the "out people" [Am ha-Aretz] were the indigenous population that had stayed put. In all historical probability it is this social dichotomy that our present mishnah seeks to reflect and perpetuate – though we must recall that the mishnah dates from a period some seven hundred years after Shivat Zion.
However, by the time we reach the Tannaïtic age the term had taken on a further (derogatory) meaning. When we studied Tractate Yadayyim 1:1 I wrote [April 29th 2001]:
The more difficult a mitzvah [commandment] is to keep the more it is likely to be ignored by some and elevated by others. Modern examples are so obvious that there is no need to mention them: Shabbat and Kashrut immediately spring to mind. In the time of the sages this was true in particular regarding the laws of ritual purity. The vast majority of the people were not punctilious in observing the multitude of minutiae associated with these mitzvot. The sages, however, made every effort to be paragons of virtue in this matter. Those who seriously took upon themselves the uttermost observance of the multifarious laws of ritual purity were termed "Ĥaverim", "Colleagues". The overwhelming majority of the people who did not were termed "Am ha-Aretz", and this must be the origin of the pejorative nature of the term (which means literally "the people of the land", peasants).
Thus we see that the term "Am ha'Aretz" was used by the sages to denote people who were not punctilious in the observance of the mitzvot. They did not match up to the standards of piety required by the sages. Hillel seems to be saying that even if a person has knowledge of the mitzvot to some extent or another, they cannot be truly pious unless they are punctilious in their observance of the mitzvot. Observing some mitzvot, he holds, is not piety; even observing all the mitzvot will not constitute acts of piety if they are performed haphazardly or half-heartedly.
6:
The classical commentators seem to wish to give the terms used in our mishnah a meaning that would enhance their own educational or philosophical agenda. Rambam, for example, explains that the 'ignoramus' is someone who "has neither wisdom nor a moral sense"; the 'fool', he says, is someone who "has some intellectual capabilities but "[only] a few of the ethical qualities." In other words, what the people lack is intellectual capability and ethical standards. Rabbi Ovadya of Bertinoro, in his commentary on our mishnah, seems to be even more condescending. He explains that the 'ignoramus' "is devoid of everything: he doesn't even know how to conduct business. He is worse than the 'fool'." Concerning the 'fool', he says that "it is possible that he could be sin-fearing [even though he is not pious], for he does know how to conduct business."
To be continued.
Quite some time ago Yehuda Wiesen asked, incidentally, whether it would ever be possible for Judaism to recognize group marriage.
Dan Werlin offers the following comment::
This is quite late, but I would respond to a point made by Yehuda Wiesen: Judaism actually used to allow group marriage in the form of polygamy. It was probably because of social and legal pressure from non-Jewish society that it became rare and was eventually abolished by Rabbeinu Gershom in the Ashkenaz world.
I comment:
Polygamy is not quite the same as group marriage, as I understand it. Without going into unnecessary detail here let me just explain that the Torah does permit a man to be married to more than one woman (at the same time); but the Torah does not permit a woman to be married to more than one man (at the same time). Dan is quite right that even the right of the man to contract a polygamous marriage has been almost abolished these past one thousand years; though, in the State of Israel, in certain very rare circumstances, the rabbinate will permit a man to contract a bigamous marriage.
