1:
Our mishnah continues the teaching of Hillel. An ignoramus in the present context is someone who is uneducated and possibly uneducable. Such a person cannot be sin-fearing by definition – however much that consideration may offend our sympathies. Judaism is a way of life that is based on a system of observance of mitzvot. If someone does not know those mitzvot or cannot understand what is required of him he cannot be observant, sin-fearing. It's as simple as that. If someone is educable they should be taught to observe as many mitzvot as their capabilities permit. Often certain observances can be taught by rote and understanding will come later.
2:
But in Judaism the general law of civilization that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is extended: ignorance of the law is in itself a sin! We are required [Joshua 1:8] to study Torah constantly, setting aside time to do so both during the day and after dark. Twice daily [Deuteronomy 6:7] we remind ourselves that we are required to teach God's precepts very carefully to out children. Indeed, the prophet [Jeremiah 33:25] maintains that God's covenant with us may even be the ultimate purpose of the universe!
3:
While it may be possible for the ignoramus to be God-fearing, he cannot be sin-fearing by definition. And the ultimate basis of Judaism, when all other options are gone, is not to be God-fearing – not even to believe in God. The ultimate basis of Judaism is observance of the mitzvot. The prophet [Jeremiah 16:11 complains that
To be continued.
In the discussion element in Avot 102 I wrote of my strong disapproval of the permission to drive on Shabbat.
Amnon Ron'el writes:
I was certain that the Conservative Movement does not permit driving on Shabbat, but does not enforce this prohibition on its members.
I respond:
There is a difference here between the Conservative Movement in North America and the Israeli branch, the Masorti Movement. More than 50 years ago the Law Committee in North America permitted the use of the automobile on Shabbat. While quasi halakhic arguments were put forward the main impetus of the permissive responsa was demographic and geographic: Conservative Jews were living further and further away in the suburbs while the synagogues remained in the centres of towns and cities. The 'heter' [permission] intended to permit driving to synagogue – and only to synagogue! – in order that such members should not be completely deprived of the opportunity of Shabbat worship. It would have been far more appropriate to embark upon a system of education that would enable such people to worship properly at home – and to encourage people to live near a synagogue or to build synagogues near where they live. The responsum of the Masorti Movement, which maintains the prohibition of driving in an automobile on Shabbat, bases itself on firm halakhic argumentation and on the fact that the demographic and geographic considerations that were the underpinning of the earlier 'heter' in North America were completely irrelevant in Israeli society today.
In Avot 102 I also wrote that in our religious development "We must never be afraid of change" but that we "must always subject the possibility of change to the inspection of tradition". Ze'ev Orzech writes:
Your statement that, "we must always subject the possibility of change to the inspection of tradition," leaves me wondering. Inspection is such a vague term; what does it consists of? What are the criteria which we must apply to help us make the decision whether to accept or reject a particular change? Must such a change be justifiable by Torah Law? And if so, how much "stretching" in the interpretation of a word or pasuk is allowed?
I respond:
Any proposed change must be defendable on the basis of accepted halakhic reasoning and precedence. By skillfully (and honestly!) manipulating the arguments put forward in the past by the halakhic masters we can find precedent for the proposed change: this would mean that it is consonant with the general thrust of traditional halakhic thinking even if it is novel in the situation under discussion. Any proposed halakhic change must therefore be justifiable by Torah law – even if the ultimate argument is that the situation is so novel that we must invoke the ancient rabbinic right of abrogating a mitzvah of the Torah in order to preserve Judaism as equitable and ethical in its directives. Any suggestion to make a sweeping change in halakhic thinking or legislation that is based mainly or entirely on the interpretation of a word or words in a specific verse is probably spurious: traditional halakhic reasoning just does not work that way!
