Sotah 074

2:
The Torah places a duty on a surviving brother to marry his deceased brother's childless widow. Such a union is termed levirate marriage [Yibbum]. (As we explained in the 2nd mishnah of Chapter 1, levir is the Latin word for a brother-in-law.) Just as the ceremony of divorce terminates an ordinary marriage, so the ceremony of Ĥalitzah terminates a levirate marriage. An ordinary marriage is created by the mutual consent of the two contracting parties; a levirate union automatically exists between the childless widow and her brother-in-law from the moment her husband dies, and this automatic connection can only be terminated by Ĥalitzah.

3:
For our present purposes we must reference the main text in this matter of the Torah [Deuteronomy 25:5-10] –

5:
When a brother-in-law terminates the connection with his sister-in-law the ceremony is termed Ĥalitzah. (The Hebrew term is connected with the verb "to take off a shoe".) This ceremony must be performed before a Bet Din. (The alternative, where the brother-in-law formalizes the connection with his sister-in-law into marriage is termed Yibbum. Modern courts will not permit Yibbum and will require Ĥalitzah in all cases.) As women became less and less insistent on being accorded their rights through Yibbum, so the ceremony of Ĥalitzah became more and more distasteful for both parties: what was intended originally as the attempt by a desperate woman to shame her late husband's brother to "do his duty" by her, now became a meaningless ceremony of degradation. From mishnaic times onwards various means were developed to obfuscate the more strident aspects of this ceremony. All involved, including the members of the Bet Din, are required to fast until after the ceremony; the "shoe" that the woman must remove from the man's foot is a special 'ceremonial' sandal provided by the court… But this still leaves the unpleasant episode of expectoration (even though the amount need not be measured!) – and the seeming untowardness of the whole ceremony, particularly now that it is mandatory.

6:
Ĥalitzah cannot be ignored, since it is an institution of Torah law. However, every effort should be made to obviate its necessity. It seems to me that the most obvious avenue to pursue in this regard is the one called "conditional divorce". This is a device whereby the husband writes a bill divorcing his wife if certain circumstances should ever arise. Thus should he die prematurely she would be a divorcee and not a widow, thus obviating the whole issue of Ĥalitzah if she is childless. But this requires bold and creative thinking from rabbinic authorities far greater than I can ever aspire to being – and I do not see such thinking at this time.

7:
Just as in the case of the previous item, Bikkurim, so also in the case of Ĥalitzah the justification of the requirement that the language used by the woman (my brother-in-law refuses to eternalize his brother's line in Israel and he refuses me levirate marriage) be Hebrew is based on a verse connected with the third item with which we have yet to deal. Rabbi Yehudah ben-Ilai disagrees with Tanna Kamma as to the reason why Hebrew is mandated. He would re-punctuate the last statement concerning the woman: she shall speak up and say, "Thus shall be done to a man who refuses to build up his brother's house!" He would have it that the phrase she shall speak up and say thus indicates that she must speak 'thusly' – in this language, Hebrew. His view is not accepted – but not, alas, because of its sheer improbability!