When one witness testifies that she was defiled and another testifies that she was not defiled; when one woman testifies that she was defiled and another woman testifies that she was not defiled, she would drink [the 'cursing waters']. When one [witness] testifies that she was defiled and two [more] witnesses testify that she was not defiled she would drink [the 'cursing waters']. When two [witnesses] testify that she was defiled and one [witness] testifies that she was not defiled she would not drink [the 'cursing waters'].
1:
This last mishnah of chapter 6 is concerned with the outcome of situations in which the testimony put before the court is contradictory. Our explanation of this present mishnah can be quick and expeditious. Three basic situations are presented in our mishnah and they must be understood as illustrating and clarifying the principles that have been established in the preceding mishnayot.
2:
We start with a situation in which two witnesses appear in court at the same time. One witness testifies that the woman whose husband is indicting her was indeed unfaithful to her husband with the man with whom he had previously issued a formal injunction against her consorting with him. Another witness, present in the courtroom, testifies that this is not so. We now have a situation in which there is mutually contradictory evidence, and if this is the only evidence forthcoming it is the same as if there were no evidence at all. And we have established throughout out study of this tractate that the sages understood the ordeal of the 'cursing waters' must be implemented only where the husband claims that his wife has been unfaithful to him but can produce no testimony to support his suspicion. When two witnesses contradict each other there is no testimony that can decide the matter one way or the other and therefore the ordeal of the 'cursing waters' is the only way of testing the husband's suspicions, and the woman is required to take them test and drink the 'cursing waters'.
3:
In his commentary on our mishnah Rambam points out that the above ruling is only valid in the circumstances that I have described: the two witnesses offer their contradictory testimony at the same time. However, as Rambam points out, if one of these two witnesses were to offer his testimony at a different time then the woman would not be required to take the test. This is because we have already established that in this matter the testimony of one witness is sufficient. So, it the first witness (as a sole witness) testifies that the woman was defiled she is excused the test because his testimony is sufficient to establish the fact of her guilt. Similarly if that first (and sole) witness testifies that she was not defiled the test is similarly obviated. Under such circumstances the testimony of the second witness is immaterial: since it too is solitary testimony it would not change the outcome.
4:
A previous mishnah established that the testimony of women (which was not usually accepted by the sages) was acceptable in the case of the Sotah – and even that of women who were interested parties, as we saw in mishnah 2. Therefore the same rule applies as the one we have already described in paragraphs 2 and 3.
5:
The third situation presented in our mishnah is one where one witness testifies that she was defiled and two other witnesses testify that she was not defiled. The Gemara [Sotah 31b-32a] says that this situation should be understood as follows: wherever the testimony of one witness is considered acceptable he is considered to be the same as two witnesses. Therefore if the one witness testifies one thing and two other witnesses testify differently we have the same situation that we have described in paragraph 2 above.
6:
The Gemara also establishes that the last item in our mishnah, which describes a situation in which two witnesses testify that she was defiled and one testifies that she was not defiled. Here the situation is understood (by the Gemara) as being a case where one competent witness testifies that the woman is innocent but two technically incompetent witnesses testify that she is guilty. In such circumstances, since we have a competent witness and his testimony is sufficient in the case of the Sotah, we can ignore the testimony of the incompetent witnesses.
7:
Perhaps I should clarify this last point by way of illustration. A man testifies that the woman is innocent; two women testify that she is guilty. The man's testimony is sufficient to excuse the wife of the need to undergo the ordeal.
This concludes our study of Chapter 6 of this Tractate.
