דף הביתשיעוריםSanhedrin

Sanhedrin 139

נושא: Sanhedrin




Sanhedrin 139

BET MIDRASH VIRTUALI
of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel


RABIN MISHNAH STUDY GROUP

Bet Midrash Virtuali

TRACTATE SANHEDRIN, CHAPTER ELEVEN (TEN), MISHNAH ONE (recap):

כָּל יִשְׂרָאֵל יֵשׁ לָהֶם חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר, "וְעַמֵּךְ כֻּלָּם צַדִּיקִים לְעוֹלָם יִירְשׁוּ אָרֶץ נֵצֶר מַטָּעַי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַי לְהִתְפָּאֵר". וְאֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם חֵלֶק לָעוֹלָם הַבָּא: הָאוֹמֵר אֵין תְּחִיַּת הַמֵּתִים מִן הַתּוֹרָה, וְאֵין תּוֹרָה מִן הַשָּׁמַיִם, וְאַפִּיקוֹרוֹס. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אַף הַקּוֹרֵא בִסְפָרִים הַחִיצוֹנִים, וְהַלּוֹחֵשׁ עַל הַמַּכָּה וְאוֹמֵר "כָּל הַמַּחֲלָה אֲשֶׁר שַׂמְתִּי בְמִצְרַיִם לֹא אָשִׂים עָלֶיךָ כִּי אֲנִי ה' רֹפְאֶךָ". אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: אַף הַהוֹגֶה אֶת הַשֵּׁם בְּאוֹתִיּוֹתָיו:

All Israel have a share in the next world, as it is said: "All your people are just, they shall inherit the earth for ever, the shoot of My planting, the work of My hands for My glorification" [Isaiah 60:21]. The following have no share in the next world: one who says that the resurrection of the dead is not from the Torah; Torah is not from Heaven; the Epikoros. Rabbi Akiva adds someone who reads heretical books and someone who mutters a spell over a wound by saying "All the malady that I set upon Egypt I will not set upon you for I, God, am your Healer" [Exodus 15:26]. Abba Sha'ul adds someone who pronounces the Name according to its letters.
EXPLANATIONS (continued):

12:
So far in our study of this mishnah we have investigated the topic of "resurrection of the dead". We found great confusion as to the precise implications of this term as reflected subsequently in our classical sources. That turning this concept into a belief is meaningless from the practical point of view is demonstrated by the logistics of our mishnah: who are those who will not be resurrected? – those who say there is no resurrection! To my mind this is very similar to "proving" that Jacob wore a hat by reference to the verse [Genesis 28:10] which tells that "Jacob went out from Beersheva and went to Ĥaran" – and is it conceivable that the patriarch would go out without a hat on his head!?

13:
The second item in the catechism of our mishnah is not really any different. It is easy to state categorically that there will be no resurrection (however understood) for those who deny that the Torah is from heaven; it is more problematic to perceive a consensus in our classical sources as to the catechismal meaning of the concept of "Torah from Heaven". And here, once again, it seems that the confusion is caused by Rambam, and again in his commentary on this very mishnah.

14:
When it comes to amplifying the implications of our mishnah the Gemara [Sanhedrin 99a] simply quotes a series of baraitot. (The Gemara dates from the period of the Amoraïm, 200-500 CE, whereas a baraita is a source from the period immediately preceding, the era of the creation of the Mishnah, considered by the Amoraïm to be more authoritative.) The baraitot seem to imply that there is a biblical source for the teaching of our mishnah:

Any person who acts haughtily … is insulting God and that soul shall be excised from its people. For having despised the word of God and negating His commandment that soul shall be excised, excised bearing its own sin [Numbers 15:30-31].

On this biblical text there is an exposition in a baraita (quoted directly from Sifré on the above verses):

For having despised the word of God – this refers to one who claims that Torah is not from Heaven. Even if he were to claim that the whole Torah is from Heaven but that one particular verse was not uttered by God but was a personal invention of Moses – [such a person is guilty of] "having despised the word of God". Even if he were to claim that the whole Torah is from Heaven with the exception of one particular rabbinic textual nicety, one inference from minor to major, one contextual inference – [such a person is guilty of] "having despised the word of God".

It is clear from this baraita that the concept of "Torah from Heaven" is not being understood as implying verbal dictation since the term "Torah" is here clearly being understood in its wider meaning, including the "Unwritten Torah", Torah she-be-al Peh, the oral tradition which embraces the rabbinic exegesis and amplification of the "Written Torah", Torah she-bikhtav. What the baraita is implying is that the whole of the Torah is divinely inspired; it is not speaking at all about the means by which the Torah has reached us. (This latter issue was one that I have already dealt with in a series of Shiurim [Sanhedrin 016 and Sanhedrin 042 through to Sanhedrin 044]. I repeat here only the culmination, which is directly concerned with the way Rambam handled this item in our mishnah:-

One of the lynch-pins of rabbinic philosophy is the concept of Torah min ha-Shamayim, that Torah (both written and oral) comes from God. This presents Conservative Judaism with no difficulty. The rabbis state [here were quoted the baraita expounded earlier]. This view, although based upon an earlier conceptualization of revelation, holds no terrors for Conservative Judaism: for it ardently maintains that the whole of the Torah (both Written and Unwritten) comes from God – in the sense already described above, in which God's will is perceived more perfectly as the human perceptors progress onward and upward. We insist that man's reaching for God is, indeed, a reaching for God, and that which is finally accepted into the tradition has proceeded from God. Even when some element or other is superseded later on with an improved understanding, it does not mean that the former teaching was not divine; it merely means that man was not yet philosophically developed to a degree that would permit him to understand the full implications of the divine in that particular matter – very much as we understand our parents more intelligently the more we grow.

However, matters do not rest here. Rambam, in the Thirteen Fundamentals that form part of a long excursus that he inserted into the preamble to his commentary to the very mishnah we are presently studying, codified this concept of Torah min ha-Shamayim [Torah from Heaven] in a way that is problematic for us:

We believe that the [Written] Torah now in our possession is identical to that given to Moses and that all of it comes from God. That is to say that all of it came to him from God in a manner that may be metaphorically termed "speech". No one but Moses can know the true nature of that contact… There is no qualitative difference between a verse like … "his wife's name was Mehetavel, daughter of Matred" [Genesis 36:39] and a verse like "I am the Lord your God" [Exodus 20:2] or "Hear, O Israel: the Lord is our God, the Lord is One" [Deuteronomy 6:4]. It all comes from God and it is all God's perfect, pure and holy Torah of truth.

Surely, had Rambam been formulating his principle today he would have phrased it differently. That which we find problematic in his words is not to be found in the original Midrash nor is it to be found in our mishnah; it was added by Rambam. We agree with Rambam that "It all comes from God and it is all God's perfect, pure and holy Torah of truth". We disagree with him when he states that "the [Written] Torah now in our possession is identical to that given to Moses". The formulation of Rambam is, of course, entirely at odds with the sentiments implied by Abraham Ibn-Ezra in several places in his commentary on the Torah; for instance see the quotation brought in our last shiur [Sanhedrin 043], and in particular the gloss on it made by Yossef Bonfils. Ibn-Ezra surely would have rejected Rambam's extension of the original Midrash, as we do – and as Rambam himself almost certainly would if he were alive today. For Rambam was an ardent proponent of the principle that we should not permit the literal meaning of Torah to contradict our verified intellectual perceptions. Rambam himself faced a dilemma similar to the one he has unwittingly created for us: he was a devoted follower of Aristotelian physics, and Aristotle had propounded the eternity of matter, whereas the Torah teaches that "in the beginning God created" matter [ĥiddush ha-olam]. Rambam says that he accepts the view of Torah on creation against the view of his intellectual hero, because Aristotle had not proven his hypothesis. If, however, the eternity of matter had been given a scientific proof "it would be possible to interpret figuratively the texts [of the Torah] in accordance with this opinion" [Guide for the Perplexed, Part Two, Chapter 25] He does not say that it would be necessary to ignore clear scientific evidence in order to maintain the verbal integrity of the Written Torah!

To be continued:

DISCUSSION:

In Sanhedrin 137 I quoted (extensively) from Rambam's commentary on the mishnah we are currently studying:

The ultimate punishment is the extinction of the soul, that it will perish and cease to exist. This is the 'excision' mentioned in the Torah. Excision means the utter extinction of the soul. In the Torah [Numbers 15:31] we read "that soul shall be absolutely cut off", and the rabbis have explained that as meaning "cut off in this world, cut off in the next". Anyone who has sunk into physical pleasure to the exclusion of the truth is cut off from that attainment and remains excised matter.

Cheryl Birkner Mack writes:

This may be an unrelated question, but I've wondered for a while about the term karet. I believe it is used in several cases in the Tora. In every case does it mean what you've described? And is there no possibility of teshuva for these offenses?

I respond:

There is no sin so great that it cannot be atoned for by sincere resentence. We have already noted that even those executed by a human court are not denied their "share in the World to Come" if their death was preceded by sincere repentance. What Rambam does say (in Mishneh Torah, Laws on Repentance) is that the crimes of certain people are so heinous that if they do not repent in time God will intervene and keep them on their chosen path until they reach their own destruction unrepentant. This is how he (Rambam) explains the hardening of Pharaoh's heart by God in the Exodus story.


Ed Frankel writes concerning the concept of resurrection:

Several years ago working at the Ramah camps a colleague gave a new explanation of teĥiyat hametim that made sense to him. He saw it as a poetic term akin in some measure to the substance of Modeh Ani that we recite each time we wake in the morning. He went on to say that he saw teĥiyat hametim as God who resurrects those who are as good as dead. His example came from real life. He had fallen asleep at the wheel of his car and went off the road. Somehow his foot came off the gas and the incline stopped the car safely while he dozed. He realized when he awoke what had happened and was henceforth able to say the bracha in the amidah with renewed fervor.

I respond:

I would have thought that Ed's colleague would have told this anecdote in order to bolster the concept of hashgaĥah perati, that God "watches out" for every single individual. The anecdote is, of course, "far out" from the rabbinic point of view as an example of teĥiyyat ha-metim. As regards the concept of teĥiyyat ha-metim in the second berakhah of the Amidah I have heard an interpretation that approaches the idea of "God who resurrects those who are as good as dead". This second berakhah of the Amidah is termed gevurot, which might be rendered into English as "Divine Power". In this berakhah the immense power of the Deity is focused on two topics. These topics are seen by the Rabbinic mind as being intertwined, different aspects of the same phenomenon. Our modern sensibilities, having been nurtured in a different mindset, would probably see these two aspects as being discrete rather than connected. This berakhah describes God's power as being manifested in the weather and in the resurrection of the dead. Perhaps the rabbinic concept will become more apparent if we think of this berakhah as affirming God as the ultimate Arbiter of Life and Death. In the agricultural economy of Eretz-Israel in Biblical and Talmudic times the falling of the rain at the appropriate time (and, of course, its not falling at inappropriate times) were quite literally matters of life and death. In our comparatively more sophisticated times (?), every winter now we in Israel are gripped by the fear that this year would be a year of drought, and even when rain does fall the agonizing question that dominates the weather reports always boils down to "by how many centimetres has the Sea of Kinneret, our National Reservoir, risen above the imaginary 'red line'?" We can now understand the comment of a famous sage, reported in the Talmud of Eretz-Israel [Ta'anit 63d] that "the rains falling at the appropriate time are welcome as [being] the resurrection of the dead". Without them there can be no life and death is inevitable. Therefore, in this second berakhah, when we celebrate the Deity as "causing the wind to blow and the rain to fall" this is no childish innocence: this is God as Arbiter of Life and Death, Wielder of the Ultimate and most Supreme Power. It thus becomes apparent that the other element that is intertwined with the weather in this berakhah, the resurrection of the dead, is not really so discrete from it.

Shabbat Shalom to everybody.




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