Sanhedrin 127
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BET MIDRASH VIRTUALI
of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel
RABIN MISHNAH STUDY GROUP
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זָקֵן מַמְרֵא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין, שֶׁנֶאֱמַר "כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט" וְגוֹ'. שְׁלשָׁה בָתֵּי דִינִין הָיוּ שָׁם; אֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב עַל פֶּתַח הַר הַבַּיִת, וְאֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב עַל פֶּתַח הָעֲזָרָה, וְאֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב בְּלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית. בָּאִים לָזֶה שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח הַר הַבַּיִת, וְאוֹמֵר "כָּךְ דָּרַשְׁתִּי וְכָךְ דָּרְשׁוּ חֲבֵרַי, כָּךְ לִמַּדְתִּי וְכָךְ לִמְּדוּ חֲבֵרָי". אִם שָׁמְעוּ אוֹמְרִים לָהֶם; וְאִם לָאו בָּאִין לָהֶן לְאוֹתָן שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח הָעֲזָרָה, וְאוֹמֵר "כָּךְ דָּרַשְׁתִּי וְכָךְ דָרְשׁוּ חֲבֵרַי כָּךְ לִמַדְתִּי וְכָךְ לִמְדוּ חֲבֵרָי". אִם שָׁמְעוּ אוֹמְרִים לָהֶם; וְאִם לָאו, אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ בָּאִים לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבְּלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית, שֶׁמִּמֶּנּוּ יוֹצֵאת תּוֹרָה לְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה'". חָזַר לְעִירוֹ וְשָׁנָה וְלִמֵּד כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהָיָה לָמֵד, פָּטוּר; וְאִם הוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת, חַיָּב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדוֹן": אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיּוֹרֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת. תַּלְמִיד שֶׁהוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת פָּטוּר – נִמְצָא חֻמְרוֹ קֻלּוֹ:
The insubordinate sage: as it is said, "Should there be a matter in judgment that is beyond your ken" etc. There were there three Batei-Din: one met at the entrance to the Temple Mount, one met at the entrance to the Courtyard, and one met in the Gazit Hall. They would come before the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and [the accused sage] would say, "This is how I interpreted [the Torah] and this is how my colleagues interpreted it; this is what I taught and this is what they taught." If [the judges] had heard [the Halakhah in this matter] they would say so, otherwise they would come before the Bet-Din that sat at the entrance to the Courtyard; [the accused sage] would say, "This is how I interpreted and this is how my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and this is what they taught." If [these judges] had heard [the Halakhah in this matter] they would say so, otherwise they would all come before the Bet-Din that met in the Gazit Hall, from which Torah proceeds to all Israel – as it is said, "… from the place which God shall choose…". If [the accused sage] returns to his town and continues to teach according to his former opinion, he is not culpable; but if he gives practical instruction he is culpable – as it is said, "… the man who shall act brazenly …" – thus he is culpable only when he gives formal instruction to act [in accordance with his own interpretation]. A student who gives practical instruction is not culpable, thus his more severe offence actually eases his situation.
EXPLANATIONS:
1:
The insubordinate sage is one who refuses to accept the decision of the majority in a substantive matter of law, and insists in giving instruction to lay people to follow his own ruling and not that of the court of which he is a member. In order to understand our mishnah we must first familiarize ourselves with its biblical origin:
Should there be a matter in judgment that is beyond your ken … you shall go to the place that God shall choose, and you shall approach the … judge that shall be [in authority] at that time. You shall enquire and they shall tell you the law. You must act according to the law as they tell it to you from that place that God shall choose; you must take care to act exactly as they instruct. In accordance with the Torah as they teach it to you, and in accordance with the judgment as they tell it to you so shall you do; you may not stray from what they tell you to the right or to the left. The man who acts brazenly and does not listen to the … judge – that man shall die. Thus shall you scour wrongdoing from Israel [Deuteronomy 17:8-12].
It is clear that this passage makes three basic stipulations. Firstly there can only be one authoritative interpretation of the law at any given time; secondly that there must be in Jerusalem ("the place that God shall choose") a supreme court to arbitrate in judgments that are in dispute among the judges; and thirdly that any judge who refuses to accept that the law is as laid down by the Supreme Court shall be condemned to death. (The mode of execution in such a case is by strangulation since the Torah, in the above passage, does not make any more specific stipulation. See Sanedrin 122 where we learned that "a rule of exegetical thumb states that wherever the Torah does not stipulate the specific mode of execution to be used strangulation applies.")
2: 3: 4: To be continued. DISCUSSION
In Sanhedrin 125 I wrote: In order to obviate the death penalty being incurred, the sages say that it is not possible for a parent to deprive his offspring of their personal freedom. Thus, a parent could only be guilty of abduction of their child if they "make servile use" of them and sell them into slavery; and even then, the penalty would be incarceration for life, not death by strangulation.
Jeffrey Bennet Smith comments: The Sages may have been conciously differentiating themselves from Roman law, which viewed the father as having absolute power over his children, even when they were adults with their own families, even with the right of ordering their death; and this power was ended only by the father's death or by a procedure which was in essence the same used to manumit slaves. Later law softened this around the edges, but the principle remained valid throughout Roman history. |