Sanhedrin 109

2:
Our mishnah continues the process of hermeneutic elucidation of the original text of the Torah, with the result that the incidence of a case of a "riotous and rebellious son" has been rendered virtually impossible. (This does not mean that there were no historical instances of such a sentence being carried out – presumably by courts that did not apply the restrictions of the sages. One sage states categorically that he was present at such a sentencing and "sat on his grave" [Gemara Sanhedrin 71a].) In our present mishnah Tanna Kamma requires both parents acting in harmonious concert to initiate the proceedings against their son. While this interpretation of the biblical text appeals to reason, it must certainly ensure that it would be extremely rare for the condition to come about: even if one of the parents can find it in his heart to charge his own son with a capital crime it is reasonable to assume that the other will have serious misgivings.

3:
However, the Gemara on our mishnah is concerned solely with the view of Rabbi Yehudah [ben-Ilai], which is different from the view of Tanna Kamma (and, of course, is not accepted halakhah). Rabbi Yehudah requires both parents to be "compatible". It is very tempting to apply here a psychological interpretation: it is the incompatibility of his parents that causes the son to rebel, and he cannot therefore be punished by them for a fault of their own making. However, this interpretation of Rabbi Yehudah's opinion is not sustained by the discussion in the Gemara. Two kinds of "incompatibility" are reviewed there: legal incompatibility and physical incompatibility. The Gemara [Sanhedrin 71a] rejects the first possibility outright: Rabbi Yehudah's use of the term "incompatible" cannot mean that the parents could not have been legally married under Halakhah, since that would in no way vitiate their standing as biological parents. An alternative is produced: what Rabbi Yehudah means is that they must be physically compatible This requirement would reduce the possibility of bringing the charge well nigh to zero! According to this, the parents must be "compatible" in voice, appearance and stature. The artificiality of this interpretation is immediately perceived: compatability of voice is adduced from the use by the Torah of the singular – "Does not hearken to our voice"; "and since we have required vocal compatibility we might just as well add the requirement of appearance and stature" [Gemara Sanhedrin 71a towards the centre of the page].

4:
The second part of our mishnah continues the almost literal elucidation of the biblical text. Words that were clearly never meant to be understood in any manner other than contextually are interpreted until the exclusionary result is obtained. Accordingly, the following conclusions are reached: the Torah must be excluding a parent who has lost the use of a hand since such a parent would not be able to fulfill the biblical text which requires the parents to "take hold" of their son. Since the text requires them to "take him" to the courtroom he or she cannot be lame. Since the text requires them to address the court neither of them can be dumb. In their address to the court the parents have to identify "this son of ours" which means that neither of them can be blind. They have to tell the court that "he does not hearken to our voice", so neither of them can be deaf (since a deaf person would not be able to testify that his or her instructions were verbally rejected). The Gemara [Sanhedrin 71a at the very bottom of the page] notes mischievously that our mishnah proves that biblical texts must be understood literally. (We have already learned enough mishnah to know that this is most certainly not the case!) Such a conclusion would undermine ninety-nine hundredths of rabbinical law, so the conclusion is immediately rejected: We can derive no such conclusion since this whole text (the description of the part of the parents in the proceedings) is quite superfluous – and must be intended to have been included only for hermeneutic purposes!

To be continued.

I'm perplexed by one point in today's lesson. You translate the mishna as "He might steal [the food] from his father….", i.e. the stolen object is food, but in your explanations the stolen object is money (used to buy food), e.g. "…by spending money that he has stolen from his father…". Which is intended?

I respond:

The traditional interpretation is the latter – that the lad steals money from his father, uses it to buy food and liqueur, and consumes these outside his father's domain.

In that same shiur I mentioned that I am at present working on a project (under the general auspices of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel) that will make RMSG and many other topics of study available from the Internet … The only thing that is greatly lacking is money…

Art Evans writes:

I am moved to make a modest contribution. Please offer an address to which funds can be sent. For those of us in the US, it would be great if there were a charitable organization recognized by the US taxing authorities (a "501(c)3" organization) so that we can take a tax deduction.

I respond:

The purpose of my remark was to explain why the project was taking time to come to full fruition, not to solicit funds. However, it would be ultimate folly and the height of ingratitude to ignore such a suggestion! Anyone on the USA who is moved to support the Virtual Bet Midrash project financially is requested to send their contribution to:

Rabbi Joel Myers, Executive Vice President,
The Rabbinical Assembly,
3080 Broadway,
New York, New York 10027.

Please mark your contribution very clearly "Virtual Bet Midrash".

I wish everyone "well over the fast" not only physically, but even more importantly as regards our spiritual well-being. May we all be sealed for a good life. Amen.