Sanhedrin 058

1:
I have taken a few liberties with the arrangement of the text of our mishnah in order to make it more easily intelligible. The first two (English) sentences have been brought forward from the previous mishnah, since Mishnah 5 is their natural continuation. In Mishnah 4 Rabbi Akiva had stated, after the long list of persons disqualified to serve as witnesses or judges in one's cause, that in addition to all the above "anyone related to one at the time [of the court case is disqualified,] but someone who had been related but is not now related is qualified". It is with this statement that Rabbi Yehudah [bar-Ilai] disagrees. All commentators also agree that the end of our present mishnah makes it quite clear that it is a continuation of the words of Rabbi Yehudah.

2:
Rabbi Akiva had said that anyone who had once been a relative but now is no longer related to the litigant may serve as a witness or judge in the case. An example of an 'ex-relative' could be a deceased wife's brother or the husband of a deceased daughter. Rabbi Yehudah points out a flaw in the reasoning: "one's grandsons from one's deceased daughter are considered relatives", so how could one be considered to be entirely unrelated to their father?

3:
The Hebrew term that I have translated 'best man' is "Shushvin", and this is the term in modern Hebrew for the friend who 'backs up' the groom on his wedding day. However, the modern Hebrew usage is obviously borrowed from Western culture. We can get a better idea of the exact meaning of the term "Shushvin" by taking a look at the commentary of Rambam [Moses Maimonides, North Africa, 12th century CE] to Tractate Bava Batra 9:4 –

It thus transpires that what Rabbi Yehudah is saying in our mishnah (according to the Gemara [Sanhedrin 28b]) is that throughout the seven days of the wedding festivities the Shushvin is too personally involved to be an objective witness or judge.

4:
The sages agree with Rabbi Yehudah that a person who was once a relative may not serve as a witness or arbitrator in matters judges by a Court of Three. However, they do not accept that a Jew will give false testimony simply because he likes or dislikes one of the litigants. They do agree that it is highly improper for someone to act as an arbitrator in a case where he has strong positive or negative feelings towards one of the litigants. (We recall that in a Court of Three the arbitrators are appointed by the mutual consent of the litigants, so it is necessary that a litigant have the legal right to disqualify an arbitrator proposed by the other litigant if he suspects that that person will not be able to do his cause justice for the reasons mentioned.)

5:
Rambam [Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 23:6-7] sums up the matter thus:-

In the Shiur of September 17th I referred to the differing attitudes between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishma'el in the matter of Torah interpretation: Rabbi Yishma'el thought that "the Torah speaks in human terms", and that it therefore contains literary embellishments and so forth that need not bear any particular hermeneutic indications, whereas Rabbi Akiva insisted on interpreting every single word of the text – even mere grammatical particles!

Ken Kraft notes that I mentioned that Rabbi Akiva's view "won out" and writes:

I assume that Rabbi Akiva's view is based on the idea that the Torah today is the document received from God at Sinai and has remained unchanged up to today. If one accepts that the document we accept today as the Torah was actually compiled by Ezra, does that not bring into question the entire interpretative system of Rabbi Akiva which continues to dominate today?

I respond:

The differing views of these two Halakhic giants on hermeneutic interpretation are the subject of one of the greatest books ever written by a Conservative scholar. Rabbi Avraham Yehoshu'a Heschel wrote a two volume work on this subject, but as far as I am aware it has never been translated from the original Hebrew. In translation its title would be "Torah from Heaven as viewed throughout History". I can assure you that the work makes for magnificent reading – if you understand the Hebrew. (Heschel's Hebrew style was no less convoluted and poetic than his English style.)

I cannot accept the premise of Ken's question, for Rabbi Yishma'el also would have had no doubt that "the Torah is the document received from God at Sinai and has remained unchanged". They were not differing about the origins of Torah, but about how to understand it. Last month I wrote at some considerable length on how one might reconcile the concept of Torah from heaven with the findings of modern biblical scholarship (and that does not necessarily have to accept that the Torah received its final redaction in the time of Ezra). Once one accepts that the Torah represents the word of God , however it has reached us, then the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishma'el will still exist: if the text is sacred writ is there not meaning to be derived from every single letter (according to Rabbi Akiva) or must we view it as a literary document (according to Rabbi Yishma'el)?

The prosaic reason why Rabbi Akiva's view prevailed is that in all Halakhic matters the rule of thumb is that "Rabbi Akiva's view prevails against all his contemporaries" [See Rashi on Eruvin 46b, and Tosafot on Betzah 21b].

David Weinstock wrote along similar lines to Ken Kraft. David, if my response to Ken does not satisfy you, please write again with clarifications.

Gemar Tov to everybody.