Pesachim VI

2:
Our mishnah may be divided into two parts. The first two sentences constitute the Reisha [first part] of
this mishnah and their contents are uncontested. The last sentence contains a difference of opinion
between Rabbi Eli'ezer and the rest of the sages.

3:
We have already mentioned (in the previous chapter) that even when Nisan 14th, the day before Passover,
fell on a Shabbat the paschal lambs were slaughtered in the Bet Mikdash during the afternoon. All actions
that were absolutely necessary for achieving this end were permitted within the Bet Mikdash even though
they were forbidden outside it. (For example, the trapping of an animal and slaughtering it for food are
both actions that are forbidden on Shabbat.) When the Torah institutes the sacrificial system
[Numbers 28:1} it requires the offerings detailed in that chapter to be offered 'at their correct
time'. When the Torah institutes the offering of the paschal lamb [Numbers 9:2] it uses the same
phraseology: the paschal lamb is to be 'done at its correct time'. From this identity of phraseology the
sages deduced (not without logical justification in this instance) that just as the Torah explicitly
requires the slaughter of the appropriate sacrifices on Shabbat despite the general Shabbat restrictions
applicable elsewhere, so the paschal lamb, which is also required to be slaughtered at its 'correct time'
(i.e. Nisan 14th) must be slaughtered even on Shabbat.

4:
Our mishnah enumerates four actions that are considered essential and therefore override the Shabbat
prohibitions: the slaughter of the animal, splashing its blood on the sides of the altar, burning its
intestinal fat on the main altar's fire stack, and the prior removal of residual feces from the animal's
apparatus for digestion and elimination. Two other actions were required before the roast lamb could be
eaten at the Seder service: the animal had to be roasted together with its entrails. These entrails were
removed, rinsed and them replaced when the animal was put on a spit for roasting. These two actions were
not permitted on Shabbat, because they could be delayed until after nightfall.

5:
The Seifa [last part] of our mishnah records a machloket [difference of opinion] between Rabbi
Eli'ezer and Tanna Kamma (the anonymous sage who represents the majority view of all the rest of the
sages). When people brought their lamb to the Bet Mikdash for slaughter (on a weekday) the most
convenient way of transporting it was to hoist it over both one's shoulders and thus carry it, rather
than lead it. Furthermore, if the animal had removable calluses (corns etc) it was unfit for sacrifice
until they were removed (because they were 'blemishes'). Hoisting the animal on one's shoulders,
carrying it and removing its calluses were all actions forbidden when Nisan 14th fell on Shabbat.
Halakhah of course follows Tanna Kamma and not Rabbi Eli'ezer.

6:
This is perhaps a good place to recount a story which in earlier times every child would have known. The
Talmud [Pesaĥim 66a] recounts that on one occasion during the latter part of the 1st century BCE
Nisan 14th fell on a Shabbat for the first time in many a long year. (For the sake of comparison let us
point out that this will be the situation in 2005 and 2008 but it will then not recur until 2021.) None
of the great sages of the age knew how the people were to take to the Bet Mikdash their slaughtering
knives (which could not be carried on Shabbat). Hillel had just made a name for himself but could not
recall how this logistic problem was to be solved. However, he told the sages not to worry: the people
would know what to do, because 'if they are not prophets they are the descendents of prophets'. And thus
it was: the people tied their knives into the lambs' fleeces, and thus the lambs were led to the Bet
Mikdash on Shabbat themselves carrying the knives which would be their own undoing.

2:
The Torah prohibits certain actions on Shabbat, and these are given the technical term melakhah
(which I have translated in this context as 'Torah-prohibited'). In addition, the sages prohibited
certain other actions on Shabbat for fear that they would almost inevitably lead to a prohibited
melakhah: these are given the technical name shevut (which I have translated as
'rabbinically-prohibited'. Where the written Torah does not give specific instructions the sages tried
to apply logical deduction in order to see whether there were instructions in any given matter implicit
in the written text. One of the methods approved for this kind of deduction is what is usually called
'inference from obvious to less obvious' [Kal va-chomer].

3:
Rabbi Eli'ezer seeks to justify his minority opinion by applying logic: slaughtering is Torah-prohibited
on Shabbat but in the case of slaughtering the paschal lamb in the Bet Mikdash it is permitted on
Shabbat. If such a serious violation of the sanctity of Shabbat is specifically permitted is it not
logical that these additional actions (hoisting etc), which are only rabbinically-prohibited, should also
be permitted?

4:
Rabbi Yehoshu'a demonstrates the weakness of the process by offering an alternative reasoning. The Torah
specifically permits certain melakhot on a festival (such as slaughtering an animal for food to be
eaten that same day), but nevertheless actions which are only shevut are prohibited. This proves
that actions in connection with the paschal lamb which are only shevut do not override the
sanctity of Shabbat.

5:
Rabbi Eli'ezer retorts that the example that is the basis of the argument of Yehoshu'a is invalid.
Preparing food on a festival is only a concession made by the Torah, but if I don't want to prepare food
on YomTov I don't have to! The slaughtering of the paschal lamb on Nisan 14th is a requirement: it must
be done regardless of my personal preference. Thus the inference suggested by Rabbi Yehoshu'a is invalid
in this context.

6:
We continue the explanation of our present mishnah, which is a record of the discussion which took place
between the three sages Eli'ezer (holding the minority view), Yehoshu'a and Akiva. Eli'ezer had held
that certain actions connected with the offering of the paschal lamb were permitted when Nisan 14th fell
on Shabbat even though these actions are prohibited on Shabbat which is not Nisan 14th. Rabbi Yehoshu'a
had refuted the reasoning of Eli'ezer, but the latter had shown a flaw also in the reasoning of Yehoshu'a.

7:
It is now that Rabbi Akiva joins the intellectual fray in support of his teacher Yehoshu'a and in
opposition to his other teacher, Eli'ezer. Eli'ezer had claimed that since slaughtering the lamb was on
Shabbat was specifically demanded by the Torah even though slaughtering animals on Shabbat was generally
prohibited by the Torah it was but logical that other actions, whose prohibition was only rabbinical in
origin, as a safeguard for the Torah prohibition, should be relaxed in this regard as well. Yehoshu'a
had demonstrated that in another case a relaxing of a Torah prohibition did not bring in its wake a
corresponding relaxation of allied rabbinic prohibitions. (The sages felt that the supremacy of the
Torah was so unchallenged that it could reverse its requirements in certain cases without suffering a
loss of credibility, but that this was not the case with man-made laws enacted by the sages.)

8:
Akiva points out that there is another case where the same situation prevails. The Torah [Numbers
19:11-13] requires that a person contaminated by contact with a corpse be ritually purified by the
sprinkling of water mixed with the ashes of a 'red heifer' on the third and seventh day after
contamination. Sprinkling, in any other context, says Akiva is prohibited by the sages on Shabbat;
should the third or seventh day of a person's ritual contamination fall on Shabbat Nisan 14th, we do not
say that this ritual must nevertheless be performed; rather we say that the person should remain ritually
unclean and not offer the paschal lamb at that time (the remedy is the subject of the next chapter).
Sprinkling is only a rabbinically-prohibited action but yet does not override Shabbat; is it not logical
therefore that slaughtering the paschal lamb, which is a Torah-prohibited action, should be able to
override Shabbat?

During the seder, why do we divide Hallel in two? Is it to create the effect that we are reciting it
during the meal itself (so that it is 'accompanying' the meal)?

I respond: Yes.

My second question is one that actually lingers from Chapter 4, where we discussed until when and where
it was permitted to do work on Erev Pesaĥ. Though we are not privileged to bring the Pesaĥ sacrifice
today, do these work restrictions still apply in our day? i.e. – must one cease from his occupational
work on erev Pesaĥ once halakhic noon has arrived?

I respond:

Wherever possible, yes. From noon onwards on Nisan 14th (when it falls on a day other than Shabbat) we
should be occupied only with preparations for the Seder if this is at all possible.

I wrote: And we should also bear in mind that the atoning efficacy of the splashing of the blood of
the slain paschal lamb on the sides of the altar was the conceptual basis for the core belief of Pauline
Christianity. Naomi Koltun-Fromm writes:

Putting aside what Paul does with this – does the Paschal sacrifice atone? Is that its main purpose? Does
the blood of any sacrifice atone no matter what the original intent (memorial?) of the sacrifice itself?

I respond:

The splashing of an animal's blood on the sides of the altar was an act of atonement: the animal's life-
blood was offered in place of my own, as it were. The rationale is: I am guilty; my life is forfeit; I
place my hands on the animal's head thus transferring my guilt, and the animal's lifeblood is sprinkled
on the altar instead of my own. Vicarious atonement (the very essence of Pauline Christianity).

Jeff Silver writes:

I must comment on the one reader who implied that bris milah [circumcision] should go the way of the
sacrificial cult. To my mind, such a view has no place in Conservative Judaism. It has become popular in
some quarters of the reform movement (where it is even called child abuse in the criminal sense of that
term), but surely somewhere Conservative Judaism has to draw some lines in the sand. (I admit to being
something of an archtraditionalist – I'm no fan of triennial Torah reading cycles, cars on shabbat, and
such other 'conservaform' developments, but I can live with their presence in our movement, if not at my
shul). But an uncircumcised male, it seems to me, is no Jew even if he adheres strictly to all other
mitzvos. I am surprised that you let the insinuation to the contrary pass without comment.

I respond:

I let it pass because I didn't think it was wise to open up that discussion at that time. I agree with
the general thrust of Jeff's message, but must correct the last sentence. A person born a Jew Jew is a
Jew by birth, not by circumcision. After all, fully half the Jewish people are not circumcised, but they
are no less Jewish! The omission of circumcision in the case of a Jewish male is a very serious omission
and if a person was not circumcised in infancy he should see to it that he is circumcised in adulthood
(unless there are clear medical contra-indications). But his physical state does not make him any the
less a Jew and any the less bound by the mitzvot. (Should he die uncircumcised by deliberate and
avoidable choice according to our tradition he is deemed to be punished by excision.)

2:
It seems that this additional offering was a kind of safety precaution 'just in case' there was not enough
meat from the paschal lamb itself to serve all the company that had subscribed to the lamb. The
'celebratory' Chagigah was eaten at the Seder before the roast lamb so that the lamb would not be
eaten greedily on an empty stomach, but gracefully, elegantly.

This kind of discussion where arguments are being brought in favour or against each opinion is very
typical to the Gemara – but very untypical for the Mishnah. Undoubtedly – wherever there is a Maĥloket
in the Mishna – the Tannaim had argued a lot and obviously had many arguments – but they are never
presented to us. What happened now? why is this mishna different from all the other mishnayot? what is
so special about the subject that convinced Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nassi to include not only the opinions but
their argumentations as well?

I respond:

This mishnah is not unique. The Gemara is not the only source we have for the way the sages argued their
cases: the collections of halakhic midrashim (Mekhilta, Sifra and Sifré) have many such examples. I
think that the compiler of the Mishnah included this discussion because it was important to him that it
be clear that even though Rabbi Eli'ezer had sound halakhic reasoning to support his view, it was the
reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshu'a that was accepted halakhah.

Still in connection with the previous mishnah, David Shemano writes:

You translate the Mishnah to use the word 'logical'. What is the Hebrew word that you are translating? Is
it a word that is found in the Bible? I guess my question is whether the concept of 'logic' was picked up
from the Greeks and/or would be used in a technical sense as used by the Greek philosophers, or has a
technically different meaning?

I respond:

The term used is a technical term which is associated with the particular kind of exposition of the
biblical text called Kal va-Chomer. The Hebrew term has several variant forms all except one of
which implies the use of logical deduction. However, it is certainly not the kind of logical reasoning
that the Greeks have left us that is in use here. Let us say that in a certain case the Torah states
quite explicitly what the law is, but in another (allied) case is silent as to the law. The sages seek
to apply certain modes of deduction to the biblical text to see if the unknown rule is implied even if it
is not explicit. (Not all of the expository methods would be recognized by us as demonstrating the
application of logic!)

In the mode in hand the reasoning is logical, but not conclusively so. In is most basic form it says
that if the unknown is obviously egregious compared with the known then it is surely logical that the law
would be… In other words, the logic is that the answer that I want to espouse is implied in the
original text even if it is not made explicit there.

4:
The whole issue of ritual purity and the paschal lamb is so complicated that it earns a chapter of its own
(chapter 9) in this tractate. Even more to the point, it is a separate and specific command in the
written Torah [Numbers 9:9-13]. It is sufficient at this point to note that someone who was in a
state of ritual impurity was not permitted to partake of the paschal lamb. If there was a situation in
which many people were (unexpectedly) in a state of ritual impurity there was no logic in bringing an
extra sacrifice, since there may not be enough people to consume the paschal lamb itself. (The written
Torah [Exodus 12:10] specifically requires nothing of the paschal lamb to be left over after the
Seder; all of it had to be eaten.)

5:
The third consideration concerning the Chagigah was the size of the paschal lamb. If the
subscription group was large and the animal small it was a good idea to have another animal to eat as well.
In this way, all subscribers would be able to eat the minimum amount of the paschal lamb (an olive's-bulk)
and to fill themselves up on the meat from the other animal. If the animal was too large for the size of
the group it made no sense to bring another animal as well and to run the risk of having meat left over.

6:
The paschal lamb had to be completely consumed by those present at the Seder by midnight. This
restriction was eased in the case of the Chagigah, which could be eaten any time up to dusk on
Nisan 15th (first day of Pesaĥ). (The phrase 'two days and one night' indicates Nisan 14th and 15th and
the night between them.) The paschal lamb had to be a male sheep or goat; the Chagigah was not
thus restricted.

7:
The Chagigah, the voluntary celebratory offering, is commemorated to this day on our Seder dish.
Together with the burned shankbone (representing the paschal lamb itself) we have a burned egg
(representing the Chagigah). (Those who do not use animal products have alternatives sanctioned by the
Talmud.)

2:
Our mishnah also deals with the reverse situation. Let us imagine a person who had handy a lamb that was
originally designated for some other voluntary sacrificial purpose and at the last minute he slaughtered
it (on Shabbat 14th Nisan) as a paschal lamb. If the animal thus substituted was not one that was
acceptable as a paschal lamb (a yearling male sheep or goat) then this person has desecrated Shabbat by
slaughtering an animal which is not sanctioned by the Torah. However, if the animal was acceptable as a
paschal lamb there is a maĥloket [difference of opinion] between rabbis Eli'ezer and
Yehoshu'a.

3:
Rabbi Eli'ezer holds that such a person must bring a sin-offering as a Sabbath desecrator. He reasons as
follows: we are agreed that it is forbidden to slaughter (on Shabbat Nisan 14th) an animal originally
designated as a paschal lamb for some other voluntary sacrificial purpose. Now, the slaughter of this
animal is prohibited even though its slaughter for its original purpose would have been permissible; the
slaughter of any other animal, even for its designated purpose, is forbidden. Is it not then logical to
deduce that the slaughter of a paschal lamb for any other purpose is prohibited and incurs the need for a
sin-offering?

4:
Rabbi Yehoshu'a disagrees and holds that if the animal actually sacrificed was acceptable as a paschal
lamb then the person offering it was excused all blame (even though the animal does not count as a
paschal lamb and another must be brought for that purpose). His reasoning is that no sin has been
willfully committed: the person making the offering thought that he was fulfilling a mitzvah.

5:
The required sacrifices mentioned by these two sages are sacrifices that the Torah requires us to offer.
For example, even on Shabbat the daily Tamid must be offered. Rabbi Eli'ezer reasons that the offering
of an animal originally intended for some other sacrificial purpose on Shabbat as one one the Torah-
required public offerings of that day is prohibited; this surely indicates that the slaughter of any
other animal for any other purpose not required by the Torah for that day is a sin. Rabbi Yehoshu'a
rejects this reasoning: everyone knows that only one lamb is slaughtered as the Tamid sacrifice on
Shabbat, and any more must therefore be prohibited and no one could claim that 'they didn't know'. The
case of the paschal lamb is different: there is no limit to the number of paschal lambs that can be
sacrificed and therefore his original reasoning still stands: no sin has been willfully committed since
the person making the offering thought that he was fulfilling a mitzvah.

6:
Rabbi Me'ir holds that there is no sin at all involved if someone slaughters an animal on Shabbat
intending it to be a required public offering. His view is not accepted halakhah, nor is that of Rabbi
Eli'ezer. Accepted halakhah follows Rabbi Yehoshu'a both as regards the paschal lamb and as regards
Torah-required public offerings.

2:
Since we learned in 5:3 that certain persons were not permitted to share a paschal lamb it follows that
if the subscription party consisted entirely of such people the slaughtering on Shabbat was invalid and
the slaughterer, therefore, liable to bring a sin-offering. (The people involved are those who cannot
eat the lamb's meat because of frailty or illness, people who have not subscribed to that particular
lamb, Jews who are not circumcised for health reasons or otherwise, and people who are ritually impure.)
If the company for whom the lamb was slaughtered was mixed consisting of both valid and invalid
participants the slaughtering must be considered valid since it certainly was done for valid people, and
since there was thus no Shabbat violation the slaughterer is excused the need to bring a sin-offering.

3:
If the animal designated as the paschal offering has physical defects the offering is invalid, since
Exodus 12:5 requires the animal to be physically 'perfect'. It logically follows that an injured animal
is an invalid sacrifice and must be replaced. If the sacrifice itself was invalid it follows that
killing it was a Shabbat violation and the 'culprit' is liable, since the animal should have been
thoroughly examined in advance. If the injury was such that it was impossible for it to be discovered
before the slaughtering there is, of course, no violation (though the animal must be replaced).

4:
The last case mentioned by our mishnah is where, after the animal had been slaughtered, one heard that
those who had originally subscribed to it had withdrawn and chosen to join a different group (or that
they had all died or had all become ritually impure). Such a slaughtering is not to be considered a
Sabbath violation since at the moment of sacrifice it was to be assumed that the action was valid and
permitted.

Just how in ancient times was it possible to measure 'one twelfth of the time that lapses between sunrise
and sunset on any given day'?

I respond:

We have dealt with this issue before. For example, I once wrote:

In earlier times almost everyone could tell the time of day with just a glance at the sky. The
horizon from east to west could be divided into twelve imaginary sections and with practice one could
tell in which section of the sky the sun was at any given time, with surprising accuracy. The day began
at sunrise, which was by definition zero hour. When the sun had traversed one twelfth of the sky in its
westward track the end of the first hour had arrived; when the sun had traversed yet one more twelfth of
the sky the end of the second hour had arrived – and so forth. When the sun was at its zenith, right
overhead, the time was noon, the end of the sixth hour. The hours would continue to be counted thus until
the sun sank below the western horizon, which point was the end of the twelfth hour. Even a child could
tell the time very broadly: if the sun was east of the zenith it was still morning; if the sun was right
overhead it was noon; and if the sun was westering, past the zenith it was afternoon.

This concludes, at long last, our study of Chapter 6, which was concerned with the peculiar
circumstances attending the slaughter of the paschal lamb when Nisan 14th falls on Shabbat.