דף הביתשיעוריםEI

Eretz-Israel 008

נושא: EI

Bet Midrash Virtuali

BET MIDRASH VIRTUALI

of the Rabbinical Assembly in Israel

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HALAKHAH STUDY GROUP

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THE SAGES AND ERETZ-ISRAEL

38:
I really must apologise for the long hiatus between this present shiur and the previous one. Some of you may know that it has been caused by the state of my health. While I am still in the woods, as it were, I think I can now see the clearing at the edge of the forest. We now continue our survey of the attempts of the sages of Eretz Israel to establish their halakhic superiority over the sages of the diaspora.

39:
One topic where the superiority of the sages of Eretz-Israel was almost beyond dispute was one which was absolutely central to Jewish life anywhere – be it in Eretz-Israel or in the diaspora. We discussed that issue in the previous shiur. Another topic, which was in dispute, was the issue of semikhah. Here we must be very careful first to clarify the terms of the discussion.

40:
Today the term semikhah is used very loosely by many people as the Hebrew equivalent of ordination: that is, the right of a person to call himself or herself a rabbi. If that is the meaning then the use of the term semikhah is a misnomer. The Hebrew word comes from a root which means – in our present context – to press down with the hands. The action of pressing down one's hand on another's head was seen as passing part of one's personality from oneself to the other. For example, the term is used extensively in connection with the sacrificial cultus: a person bringing a sacrifice was required to press his hand down on the head of the animal, thus, as it were, making the animal his substitute. For example, at the very beginning of the book of Leviticus we read:

Speak to the Israelites, and say to them: When any of you presents an offering of cattle to God, you shall make your offering from the herd or from the flock. If his offering is a burnt offering from the herd, he shall make his offering a male without blemish. He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, for acceptance in his behalf before God. He shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, that it may be acceptable in his behalf, in expiation for him. [Leviticus 1:2-4]

But we also find examples of the pressing down of the hand on someone else's head as an act of passing on authority. A very food example is when Moses is required to ordain his successor:

Moses spoke to God, saying, "Let God, the source of the breath of all flesh, appoint someone over the community who shall go out before them and come in before them, and who shall take them out and bring them in, so that God's community may not be like sheep that have no shepherd." And God
answered Moses, "Single out Joshua son of Nun, an inspired man, and lay your hand upon him. Have him stand before El'azar the priest and before the whole community, and commission him in their sight. Invest him with some of your authority, so that the whole Israelite community may obey… Moses did as God commanded him. He took Joshua and had him stand before El'azar the priest and before the whole community. He laid his hands upon him and
commissioned him… [Numbers 27:15-23]

41:

It is in this latter sense of the passing on of authority that the term semikhah was used in Talmudic times. After a student had studied for many years with a sage, at the discretion of that sage, he could be ordained. In this ceremony the ordaining sage would lay his hands on the head of the ordinand who, from that moment was entitled to use the title "rabbi". Anyone who had not been thus ordained was not entitled to use the title "rabbi". Tradition held that true semikhah could only be granted in Eretz-Israel. Thus the sages of the diaspora could not use this title – unless they had studied in Eretz-Israel and received semikhah there. Instead, the sages of the diaspora – the sages of the Babylonian Talmud! – had to "make do" with the title "rav", which indicates to this day a sage or rabbi who has not received physical semikhah.

42:
Ar a later stage the right of a sage to ordain his student was even further curtailed: it was enacted that semikhah could only be given by the President of the Sanhedrin on the recommendation of the ordinand's teacher. This was not automatic at all. In the Talmud of Eretz-Israel [Sanhedrin 6a] we find the following:

Originally each [sage] would ordain his own students. [For example,] Rabbi Yoĥanan ben-Zakkai ordained Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshu'a, and Rabbi Yehoshu'a ordained Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Akiva ordained Rabbi Me'ir and Rabbi Shim'on [ben-Yoĥai]. [At this latter ceremony the President of the Sanhedrin] said, "Rabbi Me'ir shall be seated first." Rabbi Shim'on's face crumpled. Rabbi Akiva said to him, "It is enough that I and your Creator know your worth! Show respect to this house!" [Later] they enacted that ordination by a court without the agreement of the President was not valid and ordination by the President without the agreement of the court was not valid.

Thus we see a progression: originally every sage ordained his own students; later the ordination had to be done by the President of the Sanhedrin (and we have seen that Rabbi Akiva was not even permitted to decide in which order his candidates would be accepted and had to admonish Rabbi Shim'on to accept the authority of the court with good grace). Later, the right to grant true semikhah was vested in the whole Sanhedrin who alone had the right to authorize the President to perform the ceremony.

43:
When the Sanhedrin was abolished by the Byzantine authorities in the 5th century CE true semikhah came to an end even in Eretz-Israel. In the middle ages, Rambam wrote in his magnum opus, Mishneh Torah [Sanhedrin 4:11]

If all the sages of Eretz-Israel would unanimously agree to appoint and ordain judges, then these new ordinands would possess the full authority of the original ordained judges.

Based on this ruling, an attempt was made in 1538 by Rabbi Jacob Berab of Tzefat [Safed] to restore the practice of ordination [Semikhat Zekenim]. The Encyclopedia Judaica records the unhappy (but expected) outcome of this attempt:

At Berab's initiative, twenty-five rabbis convened, and they ordained Berab as their chief rabbi. Berab then ordained four other rabbis, including Yosef Caro, the author of the Shulĥan Arukh, and Moshe di Trani, who in their turn ordained other famous rabbinic personalities, including Moshe Alshekh, who later ordained Ĥayyim Vital. Berab hoped that he could thus unify the various Jewish communities of ultimately reestablishing a Sanhedrin. However, Berab had neglected to obtain the consent of the Jerusalem rabbis. The latter felt slighted and rejected Berab when he requested that they recognize his authority. They protested his innovation, and the head of the Jerusalem rabbinate, Levi Ibn Ĥabib, wrote an entire treatise to prove the illegality of Berab's actions [Kunteres ha-Semikhah]. A caustic controversy arose between Ibn Ĥabib and Berab, and after the latter's death in 1541 the renewed institution of ordination gradually languished into obscurity.

Doesn't this seem somehow familiar? Plus ça change plus c'est la même chose!

44:
The sages of Babylon did not take their lower status without protest. One example is the right to try civil disputes. The ruling of the mishnah is that civil disputes must be tried before a court of arbitration that consisted of three arbitrators – two of whom could be lay people. However, a licenced sage could try such cases by himself with no associates. In the Gemara [Sanhedrin 5a-b] we read:

Monetary cases are decided by three; but one who is an authorized expert may judge alone. Rav Naĥman says: One like myself may adjudicate monetary cases alone. And so says Rabbi Ĥiyya. The following problem was [consequently] propounded: Does the statement 'one like myself' mean that as I have learned the tradition and am able to exercise reason, and have also obtained authorization [so must he who wishes to render a legal decision alone]; but that if he has not obtained authorization, his judgment is invalid; or [does it mean that] his judgment valid even without such authorization? Come and hear! Mar Zutra, the son of Rav Naĥman, judged a case alone and gave an erroneous decision. On appearing before Rav Joseph, he was told: "If both parties accepted you as their judge, you are not liable to make restitution. Otherwise, go and indemnify the injured party." Hence it can be inferred that the judgment of one [sole sage], though not authorized, is valid. Rav says: Whosoever wishes to decide monetary cases by himself and be free from liability in case of an erroneous decision, should obtain authorization from the Exilarch. And thus [also] says Shemu'el.

We discussed the origins of the office of the Exilarch in EI 005. The Gemara now continues:

It is clear that an authorization held from the Exilarch 'here' [in Babylon] holds good 'here' – and one from the authority 'there' [in Eretz-Israel] is valid 'there'.

But this attempt to create some kind of equality between the two centres did not end at this point – as we shall see, God willing, in our next shiur.

To be continued.

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