Berakhot 050

12:
The historical-sociological situation that we have been describing has, of course, implications for the present (and the future), since it pervades the ambience of the discussion on the halakhic status of women to this day. We live in an age and in a society (Western-type society in general) in which women are no longer considered social and legal subordinates. In all spheres of social importance women are accorded – in theory at any rate – an equal status with men, or at the very least it is generally conceded that they should be. The average woman no longer wishes to be secluded from public gaze or excused from public duty – in that she is a woman. That is as true in our synagogues as it is in the shopping mall, the courtroom or public transport. Marriage is now seen as a partnership between two equals who have an equal and parallel claim on each other. Thus we have a situation in which the halakhic basis governing the duties and privileges of women (their status before the law, halakhah) no longer accords with almost universally held understanding. The heretofore halakhic basis derives from Torah interpretations (in the Midrashim and in the Gemara) that sometimes seem almost ingenuous. I bring but one example, both because it is typical and also because it is no longer practically relevant. A woman who brought a private sacrifice to the Bet Mikdash was not permitted to lay her hand on its head, as was required of a man in a similar capacity. The reason derives from the midrashic interpretation of the Torah basis, Leviticus 1:2. "'Speak unto the sons of Israel [b^eney Israel]' – the sons' of Israel lay hands, the daughters of Israel do not". How easy it would have been to interpret b^eney Israel as including both men and women! It is almost as if the midrash uses the verse to 'prove' a conclusion already arrived at!

To be continued.

Jack Lipinsky writes:

You note that the Eved Kena'ani could assume all mitzvot that were incumbent upon Jewish women if he elected to be circumcised after the first year in his master's house. You then wrote that after he was released at the end of the sixth year, he would be a "full Jew in every respect". Am I missing something, or does he suddenly have to perform a greater number of Mitzvot (all those incumbent on a man) after the sixth year, whereas before he only had to do those incumbent upon women? Or is this simply an omission and you meant to say that male slaves after circumcision in the first year had to perform all mitzvot relevant to males, while ammot had to perform all mitzvot incumbent upon Jewish women after tevila?

I respond:

There are a misunderstandings here, caused by Jack not correctly differentiating between the Eved Ivri [involuntarily indentured Jewish-born servant] and the Eved Kena'ani [gentile-born servant] (read again Berakhot 048, explanation # 3). Only the Eved Ivri was released at the end of six years, and during the whole time of his indentured service he was ritually a full Jew in all respects, excused none of the commandments that he would be obligated to observe as a free person. The Eved Ivri is not the slave of our mishnah. The Eved Kena'ani, on the other hand, could only gain his freedom by an act of manumission by his master. At the end of one year in the service of a Jew (if he chose to remain) he was circumcised and bathed in a Mikveh as any other male proselyte (convert to Judaism). However, he was only required to observe those mitzvot that were incumbent upon Jewish women, since he, too, "was not his own master". If his master manumitted him he was obliged to observe all the mitzvot that obligate a free Jew.

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Also concerning the explanations of Berakhot 048, Karol Kestler writes:

I see a definition of Women and Children that does not include human females under the age of 12. What am I missing?

I respond:

You're not missing anything. The Jewish female child (like her male counterpart) is not obligated to observe any mitzvot (except by way of education and training): that's what becoming Bar-Mitzvah and Bat-Mitzvah is all about!

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In Berakhot 047 I wrote: The reciting of the associated berakhot is an institution of the rabbis (as are all the berakhot).

Ron Kaminsky asks:

Birkat ha-Mazon is also mi-de-rabbanan? (After all, doesn't the Torah say "v'achalta v'savata uverachta"?)

I respond:

When I wrote those words I knew that I was begging this question, and I am indebted to Ron for obliging. The duty of Birkhat ha-Mazon is mi-de-orayta [from the Torah], as Ron has correctly quoted; the text of Birkhat ha-Mazon (as are all the berakhot) is mi-de-rabbanan [an institution of the rabbis].

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