Bava Kamma 055

נושא: BK

BET MIDRASH VIRTUALI

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Today's shiur is dedicated in memory of my father,
Aharon Eliya ben Hayyim Hirsch Roth z"l,
On the occasion of his 40th Yahrzeit,
Which is tomorrow, 11th Tammuz.

Someone who causes a conflagration via a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, is not liable under human law, but is liable under the law of heaven. If one does so via a sane person that sane person is liable. [In a case where] one person supplies the fire and another supplies the wood, it is the one who supplies the wood who is liable; if one supplies the wood and another supplies the fire it is the one who supplied the fire who is liable. If someone else comes along and fans the sparks it is the one who fanned the sparks who is liable. If the wind fanned the sparks none are liable.

If someone causes a conflagration which consumes trees, stones or dirt he is liable because [the Torah] says: "When a fire is started and spreads to thorns,so that stacked, standing, or growing grain is consumed, he who started the fire must make restitution."

If it crosses over a four-cubit high fence, or a public highway, or a stream he is not liable. When someone ignites a fire in his own property how far may the fire spread? Rabbi El'azar ben-Azaryah says that [the judges] must assess it as if it were in the centre of a Bet Kor. Rabbi Eli'ezer says sixteen cubits, like a public highway. Rabbi Akiva says fifty cubits. Rabbi Shim'on says "he who started the fire must make restitution": it all depends on the fire [itself].

7:
In the Babylonian Talmud our present mishnah is presented as three separate mishnahs. We must now consider the second part of our mishnah, which is, as said, a new mishnah in the Talmud.

8:
We are now concerned with the extent of liability for damage caused when preventive measures had been taken. As we learned in the previous shiur, the Torah places the liability for damages on the individual who actually causes the fire. But the same verse in the Torah [Exodus 22:5] also relates to the actual damage that the fire has wrought:

When a fire is started and spreads to thorns,so that stacked, standing, or growing grain is consumed, he who started the fire must make restitution.

The Gemara [BK 60a] wants to know why scripture found it necessary to mention four kinds of produce that might be affected. Surely, such an issue could have been more concisely expressed. Are not the terms 'stacks', 'standing [i.e. as yet unreaped] corn' and the 'field' [of produce] saying almost the same thing? The following response is offered:

If God had mentioned only 'thorns', one might assume that it was only in the case of thorns that the Torah imposes liability, because fire is found often among them and carelessness in regard to them is frequent,whereas in the case of 'stacks',which do not often catch fire (and people are not usually careless regarding their stacks of corn),one might have assumed that there is no liability. [Alternatively,] if the Torah had mentioned only 'stacks', one might have assumed that it was only in the case of 'stacks' that the Torah imposes liability, as the loss involved in such cases is considerable, whereas in the case of 'thorns' where the loss involved is negligible one might assume that there is no liability.

Thus two different rulings are learned from these two 'instances': the extent of precautions people habitually take with their produce is irrelevant to the extent of their liability for damage caused, just as the extent of the financial loss sustained is not relevant to the imposition of liability.

The Gemara continues:

But why was it necessary [to mention separately] 'standing corn'? [The answer is, in order to teach that] just as 'standing corn' is in an open place [i.e. a field], so might anything which is in an open space [and is damaged by fire fall under the rubric of liability]… And why was 'field' [specified]? – in order to include [a situation in which] the fire laps his neighbour's ploughed field, and chars his stones.

In other words, anything that is damaged by fire requires compensation, and the incendiary cannot claim that the law of the Torah only relates to produce in a field. The sages here are understanding the word 'field' as referring to the ground itself and not just the produce growing in it.

9:
However, the Gemara continues with its objection in this last regard:

Why did the Torah just mention 'field'? In such a case the others would not have been necessary [at all]? [This is rejected.] They would still need [to be mentioned]. For if the Torah had only mentioned 'the field', one might have assumed that anything in the field would come under the same ruling, but not anything else. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so].

10:
The last part of our mishnah, a new mishnah in the Talmud, is concerned with liability in unusual circumstances.

If it crosses over a four-cubit high fence, or a public highway, or a stream he is not liable.

In all such cases it would be very remarkable for a fire to extend over these obstacles. The fences, or walls, between the allotments were almost always made from stones, piled one on top of another. Four cubits in metric terms is about two metres (which is something in the region of 6 feet). It would have to be a raging fire whose flames are rising high for it to surmount such a wall of stones. Mostly, the fires were of stubble low on the ground.

The public highway is defined as being an open space 16 cubits wide, which is about 8 metres (about 25 feet).

It is difficult indeed to imagine a fire which will cross a river. The Gemara suggests that the tanna of our mishnah might be referring to a wadi: in the winter it has water in the channel, but in the summer it is dry. When it is dry the fire could cross it. Alternatively, the tanna is referring to an artificial canal dug between fields whose purpose is to channel water to the fields. When water is channeled into the canal it is wet, but otherwise it is dry.

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