Sotah 066

It would have been logical [to reason] that since the earlier testimony (which does not bar her for life) requires at least two witnesses, the later testimony (which does bar her for life) should also require no less than two. But the Torah says, "and there is no witness against her" - [implying] any evidence whatsoever. We may now make a logical deduction from minor to major: since for the later testimony (which bars her for life) one witness is sufficient, for the earlier testimony it is but logical that one witness be sufficient. The Torah says, "because he has found in her something wrong", and elsewhere says, "something [a fact at law] must be established by two witnesses": just as the latter case requires two witnesses so the former must require two witnesses.

1:
So far we have established that when a man wishes to warn his wife not to consort with a certain man that injunction must be issued in the presence of two competent witnesses. We have also established (in mishnah 2) that the testimony of one witness (and even if that witness was an interested party) would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case for her adultery.

2:
Our present mishnah refers to the testimony that she had been warned as 'the earlier testimony' and the testimony that she had been unfaithful as 'the later testimony'. In the former case, where the husband has no proof of his wife's infidelity he may require her to undertake the test of the 'cursing waters' to satisfy himself of her innocence. In such a case, as we have seen in the 3rd mishnah of Chapter 1, conjugal relations between the husband and wife were forbidden until after she had successfully passed the test, when they would be resumed. This is what our present mishnah means by stating that the earlier testimony does not bar her for ever (but only until after the test). However, the later testimony (that establishes grounds for her divorce) means that conjugal relations between the husband and the wife will never be resumed.

3:
Our mishnah admits that sheer logic would require us to assume the opposite of what has been established. It is logical that a situation in which the consequence is only temporary cessation of conjugal relations must be less stringent than a situation where the cessation would be permanent. Since it is established that 'the former testimony' requires two competent witnesses, it is surely illogical to have a situation in which the more stringent case is established by less stringent testimony! And yet that is exactly the situation that we have established!

To be continued.

I wrote: In cases where] the husbands die before the women can drink [the 'cursing waters'], Bet Shammai say that they collect their Ketubah and do not drink, whereas Bet Hillel say that they neither drink nor collect their Ketubah.

Meir Noach writes:

It appears here that Bet Shammai is giving more rights to women. As it does by allowing divorce only if the woman has been unfaithful (and maybe unable to conceive) Are there other times when Shammai seems to give more protection to women?

I respond:

I do not believe so. Generally speaking, the Shammuti school was very conservative as regards the social status of women.

Michael Lewyn writes:

So let me see if I have this straight:

No witnesses (but suspicious husband) = Sotah;
One witness (or two inadequate witnesses) = no Sotah but automatic divorce (sometimes with payment of ketubah money, sometimes without);
Two adequate witnesses = Execution (assuming all death penalty related safeguards satisfied).

The most morally ambiguous case seems to be the middle case - where, based on inadequate testimony, a divorce is automatic. Weren't the rabbis a bit troubled about breaking up a family based on iffy testimony? Or are we about to study that?

I respond:

First of all I really must compliment Michael on such a succinct presentation of the situation. And, yes, his presentation is accurate.

I had not realized this before, but Michael may well be right in his intuition that what follows (mishnah 3, which we studied above) is an attempt at hermeneutic justification of this rather extraordinary situation.