RABIN MISHNAH STUDY GROUP


TRACTATE PESAĤIM, CHAPTER SIX

Mishnah 1 | Mishnah 2 | Mishnahs 3 & 4 | Mishnah 5 | Mishnah 6



àÅìÌåÌ ãÀáÈøÄéí áÌÇôÌÆñÇç ãÌåÉçÄéï àÆú äÇùÌÑÇáÌÈú, ùÑÀçÄéèÈúåÉ åÌæÀøÄé÷Çú ãÌÈîåÉ åÌîÄçåÌé ÷ÀøÈáÈéå åÀäÆ÷ÀèÅø çÂìÈáÈéå, àÂáÈì öÀìÄéÌÈúåÉ åÇäÂãÈçÇú ÷ÀøÈáÈéå àÅéðÈï ãÌåÉçÄéï àÆú äÇùÌÑÇáÌÈú. äÇøÀëÌÈáÈúåÉ åÇäÂáÈàÈúåÉ îÄçåÌõ ìÇúÌÀçåÌí, åÇçÂúÄéëÇú éÇáÌÇìÀúÌåÉ, àÅéï ãÌåÉçÄéï àÆú äÇùÌÑÇáÌÈú. øÇáÌÄé àÁìÄéòÆæÆø àåÉîÅø, ãÌåÉçÄéï:

The following matters concerning the paschal lamb override Shabbat: its slaughter, the splashing of its blood, the removal of its feces and the incineration of its intestinal fat. But roasting it and rinsing its internal organs do not override Shabbat. Hoisting it, carrying it from outside the precincts [of the Bet Mikdash] and removing its calluses do not override Shabbat, but Rabbi Eli'ezer says that they do.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:
Chapter 6 continues the review of issues connected with the celebration of Pesaĥ in the Bet Mikdash. I am sure that many of us must be impatient at this concentration on the slaughter of the paschal lamb on Nisan 14th and would prefer the Mishnah to move on to more 'relevant' topics. But we must remember (as we have mentioned on several occasions so far) that while the Bet Mikdash existed the slaughter of the paschal lamb within the Bet Mikdash and roasting it and eating it later that evening at the Seder service were the most fascinating and significant details of the festival's observance for our ancestors. To this day the paschal lamb is symbolically present on our Seder table as a roasted bone (or its equivalent). And we should also bear in mind that the atoning efficacy of the splashing of the blood of the slain paschal lamb on the sides of the altar was the conceptual basis for the core belief of Pauline Christianity.

2:
Our mishnah may be divided into two parts. The first two sentences constitute the Reisha [first part] of this mishnah and their contents are uncontested. The last sentence contains a difference of opinion between Rabbi Eli'ezer and the rest of the sages.

3:
We have already mentioned (in the previous chapter) that even when Nisan 14th, the day before Passover, fell on a Shabbat the paschal lambs were slaughtered in the Bet Mikdash during the afternoon. All actions that were absolutely necessary for achieving this end were permitted within the Bet Mikdash even though they were forbidden outside it. (For example, the trapping of an animal and slaughtering it for food are both actions that are forbidden on Shabbat.) When the Torah institutes the sacrificial system [Numbers 28:1} it requires the offerings detailed in that chapter to be offered 'at their correct time'. When the Torah institutes the offering of the paschal lamb [Numbers 9:2] it uses the same phraseology: the paschal lamb is to be 'done at its correct time'. From this identity of phraseology the sages deduced (not without logical justification in this instance) that just as the Torah explicitly requires the slaughter of the appropriate sacrifices on Shabbat despite the general Shabbat restrictions applicable elsewhere, so the paschal lamb, which is also required to be slaughtered at its 'correct time' (i.e. Nisan 14th) must be slaughtered even on Shabbat.

4:
Our mishnah enumerates four actions that are considered essential and therefore override the Shabbat prohibitions: the slaughter of the animal, splashing its blood on the sides of the altar, burning its intestinal fat on the main altar's fire stack, and the prior removal of residual feces from the animal's apparatus for digestion and elimination. Two other actions were required before the roast lamb could be eaten at the Seder service: the animal had to be roasted together with its entrails. These entrails were removed, rinsed and them replaced when the animal was put on a spit for roasting. These two actions were not permitted on Shabbat, because they could be delayed until after nightfall.

5:
The Seifa [last part] of our mishnah records a machloket [difference of opinion] between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Tanna Kamma (the anonymous sage who represents the majority view of all the rest of the sages). When people brought their lamb to the Bet Mikdash for slaughter (on a weekday) the most convenient way of transporting it was to hoist it over both one's shoulders and thus carry it, rather than lead it. Furthermore, if the animal had removable calluses (corns etc) it was unfit for sacrifice until they were removed (because they were 'blemishes'). Hoisting the animal on one's shoulders, carrying it and removing its calluses were all actions forbidden when Nisan 14th fell on Shabbat. Halakhah of course follows Tanna Kamma and not Rabbi Eli'ezer.

6:
This is perhaps a good place to recount a story which in earlier times every child would have known. The Talmud [Pesaĥim 66a] recounts that on one occasion during the latter part of the 1st century BCE Nisan 14th fell on a Shabbat for the first time in many a long year. (For the sake of comparison let us point out that this will be the situation in 2005 and 2008 but it will then not recur until 2021.) None of the great sages of the age knew how the people were to take to the Bet Mikdash their slaughtering knives (which could not be carried on Shabbat). Hillel had just made a name for himself but could not recall how this logistic problem was to be solved. However, he told the sages not to worry: the people would know what to do, because 'if they are not prophets they are the descendents of prophets'. And thus it was: the people tied their knives into the lambs' fleeces, and thus the lambs were led to the Bet Mikdash on Shabbat themselves carrying the knives which would be their own undoing.

DISCUSSION:

Richley Crapo asked this question: What is your estimate of the possible number of sacrifices that were made in preparation for the Seder? I responded in dismay: I had hoped that such a question would not be asked, because I have been pondering it myself for some time and have no answer so far... What parameters could we use to arrive at a suggested number? - the number of people who could be crammed into the physical limits of the priestly courtyard, perhaps? In the meantime I have received several suggestions which I present here for your consideration:

Ed Frankel:

I doubt that there could be any real parameters. Size is of no consequence, as the sacrifices would have certainly been offered in many shifts. Further, there is no way to know how many families truly ventured to Jerusalem on the Pilgrimages. While we would all love to believe that most families did, the historians seem to indicate otherwise. Frankly, just the idea that the practice established in Torah was continued with enthusiasm seems enough for me.

I respond:

Many shifts? We ourselves learned in the mishnah that there were only three shifts!

Zackary Berger:

I think a reasonable way to proceed (in 'order of magnitude' fashion) is to divide the area of the Azarah by the amount of space a person takes up. Daled amot is too much. Maybe a meter squared? In any case, that would be an interesting calculation to perform.

I comment:

'Dalet Amot' means 'four cubits' and is the rabbinic calculation of an individual's 'personal space'. Since a cubit is approximately 50 centimetres Zackary is right that 'Daled amot is too much' to allow per person; but then I think that even 'a meter squared' would also be too much.

Steven Weintraub really tries to come to grips with the issue. (I intersperse my own clarifications):

I don't know why - but this question sprung a morbid fascination in me, so that I been thinking of it on and off since this post. I'll give you the benefit of my thoughts and maybe it'll help. My background is in efficiency in algorithm design, so it might be that its just down my specialty.

The way I think about it is there is a line of Cohens going from the slaughter table to The Altar. [Actually, more than one line - SR.] At the front of the line are two Cohens, one to facilitate the slaughter, the other with the basin (who will - when it filled with blood - turn and pass the bowl down the brigade to the altar). For each lamb, the participant will bring his lamb up, the facilitating Cohen will ask 'is the lamb intended for Pesaĥ?' help in the blessings and the slaughter. The blood is then passed down to the altar and while this is happening the first participant removes his lamb to the flaying and the next participant brings up his lamb. [Why is Steven assuming 'one lamb at a time'? My guess is that several - many? - could be accommodated at the same time - SR.]

I think the constraining factor is the average time it takes to slay each lamb. In the most assembly line fashion I can't see this happening faster than 15 seconds/lamb average - but someone more familiar with the shochet [slaughter - SR] process needs to step in on this. It might be faster once the line gets moving, but I'm thinking in average. I'm thinking 5 hours - 2 hours for the first two groups, 1 for the last group. If we want to try to achieve the 60,000 number [the typological number was actually 600,000 - SR], this means the first two groups are 24,000 participants and the last group 12,000. The singing of Hallel is not the constraining factor. A good choir can spend minutes per line and still keep the tempo up. And I think a good tempo is needed to keep the process going (I know morbid).

But here are some commensurate timings for each line:

Average timing Per minute Per hour in 5 hours lines needed for 60,000
10 seconds 6 360 1800 34
15 4 240 1200 50
20 3 180 900 67
30 2 120 600 100

If each line consisted of 6 Cohens with one leader. I also imagine there has to be an extra 2 Cohens/per line (at least) to assist in the flaying. And maybe 50 Cohens to help the orchestration. This means in the first group you would have 24,000 participants and 500 Cohens for the slaughter. While the area is small - 24,000 people (even each holding a lamb) can squeeze in a small space - not discounting the miracle of the expanding interior space.

I admit this is all morbid, but for some reason it fascinated me. I won't go into the calculation on the litres of blood or the kilos of kidneys. I know I have made some gross (no pun intended) simplifications, but I think this a good start basis for working out the problem.

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Rabbi Eli'ezer said: 'Is it not logical? - Slaughtering is a [Torah- prohibited] action and yet overrides Shabbat; surely these, which are only rabbinically-prohibited should override Shabbat!' Rabbi Yehoshu'a retorted: 'A festival can prove [you wrong]. They permitted [Torah-prohibited] actions on it but prohibited rabbinically-prohibited [actions].' Rabbi Eli'ezer responded: 'What is this, Yehoshu'a? How can a concession be compared with a requirement?' Rabbi Akiva answered: 'Sprinkling can prove it. This is a requirement and also a rabbinically prohibited action and it does not override Shabbat; so you should not be surprised that these, even though they are a requirement and rabbinically prohibited actions should [also] not override Shabbat.' Rabbi Eli'ezer said to him, 'I apply the following logical argument: slaughtering is a [Torah-prohibited] action which overrides Shabbat; sprinkling is [only]> a rabbinically-prohibited action. Is it not logical that it should override Shabbat?' Rabbi Akiva replied to him: 'Or the opposite! Sprinkling is a rabbinically- prohibited action and does not override Shabbat; is it not logical that slaughtering, which is a Torah- prohibited action, should override Shabbat?' Rabbi Eli'ezer responded to him: 'Akiva, you have removed a Torah-specific requirement! It is written "in the afternoon ... at its appointed time" - be it a weekday or Shabbat!' He replied: 'Rabbi, show me an appointed time for these which is similar to the appointed time for slaughtering.' Rabbi Akiva states a general rule: any action that can be done before Shabbat cannot override Shabbat; slaughtering, which cannot be done before Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:
In order to understand our present mishnah we must remind ourselves of the previous mishnah. In mishnah 1 Rabbi Eli'ezer had expressed a minority opinion that certain actions connected with the offering of the paschal lamb were permitted when Nisan 14th fell on Shabbat even though these actions are prohibited on Shabbat which is not Nisan 14th. (These actions were hoisting it onto one's shoulders to carry it through town and removing calluses from the animal.) Our present mishnah affords us a wonderful opportunity to enter into the grove in Yavneh where the Sanhedrin met under the presidency of Rabban Gamli'el and to overhear, as it were, a discussion between three giants: Rabbi Eli'ezer (who holds the minority opinion in mishnah 1), his friend, colleague and rival Rabbi Yehoshu'a and the even greater pupil of both of them, Rabbi Akiva. (Perhaps we can note that these are three of the five sages mentioned in the Haggadah who discussed the Exodus all night in Bnei-Berak; they were joined on that occasion by rabbis Tarfon and El'azar ben-Azaryah.)

2:
The Torah prohibits certain actions on Shabbat, and these are given the technical term melakhah (which I have translated in this context as 'Torah-prohibited'). In addition, the sages prohibited certain other actions on Shabbat for fear that they would almost inevitably lead to a prohibited melakhah: these are given the technical name shevut (which I have translated as 'rabbinically-prohibited'. Where the written Torah does not give specific instructions the sages tried to apply logical deduction in order to see whether there were instructions in any given matter implicit in the written text. One of the methods approved for this kind of deduction is what is usually called 'inference from obvious to less obvious' [Kal va-chomer].

3:
Rabbi Eli'ezer seeks to justify his minority opinion by applying logic: slaughtering is Torah-prohibited on Shabbat but in the case of slaughtering the paschal lamb in the Bet Mikdash it is permitted on Shabbat. If such a serious violation of the sanctity of Shabbat is specifically permitted is it not logical that these additional actions (hoisting etc), which are only rabbinically-prohibited, should also be permitted?

4:
Rabbi Yehoshu'a demonstrates the weakness of the process by offering an alternative reasoning. The Torah specifically permits certain melakhot on a festival (such as slaughtering an animal for food to be eaten that same day), but nevertheless actions which are only shevut are prohibited. This proves that actions in connection with the paschal lamb which are only shevut do not override the sanctity of Shabbat.

5:
Rabbi Eli'ezer retorts that the example that is the basis of the argument of Yehoshu'a is invalid. Preparing food on a festival is only a concession made by the Torah, but if I don't want to prepare food on YomTov I don't have to! The slaughtering of the paschal lamb on Nisan 14th is a requirement: it must be done regardless of my personal preference. Thus the inference suggested by Rabbi Yehoshu'a is invalid in this context.

6:
We continue the explanation of our present mishnah, which is a record of the discussion which took place between the three sages Eli'ezer (holding the minority view), Yehoshu'a and Akiva. Eli'ezer had held that certain actions connected with the offering of the paschal lamb were permitted when Nisan 14th fell on Shabbat even though these actions are prohibited on Shabbat which is not Nisan 14th. Rabbi Yehoshu'a had refuted the reasoning of Eli'ezer, but the latter had shown a flaw also in the reasoning of Yehoshu'a.

7:
It is now that Rabbi Akiva joins the intellectual fray in support of his teacher Yehoshu'a and in opposition to his other teacher, Eli'ezer. Eli'ezer had claimed that since slaughtering the lamb was on Shabbat was specifically demanded by the Torah even though slaughtering animals on Shabbat was generally prohibited by the Torah it was but logical that other actions, whose prohibition was only rabbinical in origin, as a safeguard for the Torah prohibition, should be relaxed in this regard as well. Yehoshu'a had demonstrated that in another case a relaxing of a Torah prohibition did not bring in its wake a corresponding relaxation of allied rabbinic prohibitions. (The sages felt that the supremacy of the Torah was so unchallenged that it could reverse its requirements in certain cases without suffering a loss of credibility, but that this was not the case with man-made laws enacted by the sages.)

8:
Akiva points out that there is another case where the same situation prevails. The Torah [Numbers 19:11-13] requires that a person contaminated by contact with a corpse be ritually purified by the sprinkling of water mixed with the ashes of a 'red heifer' on the third and seventh day after contamination. Sprinkling, in any other context, says Akiva is prohibited by the sages on Shabbat; should the third or seventh day of a person's ritual contamination fall on Shabbat Nisan 14th, we do not say that this ritual must nevertheless be performed; rather we say that the person should remain ritually unclean and not offer the paschal lamb at that time (the remedy is the subject of the next chapter). Sprinkling is only a rabbinically-prohibited action but yet does not override Shabbat; is it not logical therefore that slaughtering the paschal lamb, which is a Torah-prohibited action, should be able to override Shabbat?

DISCUSSION:

Lyle Himmel writes:

During the seder, why do we divide Hallel in two? Is it to create the effect that we are reciting it during the meal itself (so that it is 'accompanying' the meal)?

I respond: Yes.

My second question is one that actually lingers from Chapter 4, where we discussed until when and where it was permitted to do work on Erev Pesaĥ. Though we are not privileged to bring the Pesaĥ sacrifice today, do these work restrictions still apply in our day? i.e. - must one cease from his occupational work on erev Pesaĥ once halakhic noon has arrived?

I respond:

Wherever possible, yes. From noon onwards on Nisan 14th (when it falls on a day other than Shabbat) we should be occupied only with preparations for the Seder if this is at all possible.


I wrote: And we should also bear in mind that the atoning efficacy of the splashing of the blood of the slain paschal lamb on the sides of the altar was the conceptual basis for the core belief of Pauline Christianity. Naomi Koltun-Fromm writes:

Putting aside what Paul does with this - does the Paschal sacrifice atone? Is that its main purpose? Does the blood of any sacrifice atone no matter what the original intent (memorial?) of the sacrifice itself?

I respond:

The splashing of an animal's blood on the sides of the altar was an act of atonement: the animal's life- blood was offered in place of my own, as it were. The rationale is: I am guilty; my life is forfeit; I place my hands on the animal's head thus transferring my guilt, and the animal's lifeblood is sprinkled on the altar instead of my own. Vicarious atonement (the very essence of Pauline Christianity).


Jeff Silver writes:

I must comment on the one reader who implied that bris milah [circumcision] should go the way of the sacrificial cult. To my mind, such a view has no place in Conservative Judaism. It has become popular in some quarters of the reform movement (where it is even called child abuse in the criminal sense of that term), but surely somewhere Conservative Judaism has to draw some lines in the sand. (I admit to being something of an archtraditionalist - I'm no fan of triennial Torah reading cycles, cars on shabbat, and such other 'conservaform' developments, but I can live with their presence in our movement, if not at my shul). But an uncircumcised male, it seems to me, is no Jew even if he adheres strictly to all other mitzvos. I am surprised that you let the insinuation to the contrary pass without comment.

I respond:

I let it pass because I didn't think it was wise to open up that discussion at that time. I agree with the general thrust of Jeff's message, but must correct the last sentence. A person born a Jew Jew is a Jew by birth, not by circumcision. After all, fully half the Jewish people are not circumcised, but they are no less Jewish! The omission of circumcision in the case of a Jewish male is a very serious omission and if a person was not circumcised in infancy he should see to it that he is circumcised in adulthood (unless there are clear medical contra-indications). But his physical state does not make him any the less a Jew and any the less bound by the mitzvot. (Should he die uncircumcised by deliberate and avoidable choice according to our tradition he is deemed to be punished by excision.)

àÅéîÈúÇé îÅáÄéà çÂâÄéâÈä òÄîÌåÉ, áÌÄæÀîÇï ùÑÆäåÌà áÈà áÌÇçÉì áÌÀèÈäÃøÈä åÌáÀîËòÈè. åÌáÄæÀîÇï ùÑÆäåÌà áÈà áÌÇùÌÑÇáÌÈú áÌÄîÀøËáÌÆä åÌáÀèËîÀàÈä, àÅéï îÀáÄéàÄéï òÄîÌåÉ çÂâÄéâÈä:

çÂâÄéâÈä äÈéÀúÈä áÈàÈä îÄï äÇöÌÉàï, îÄï äÇáÌÈ÷Èø, îÄï äÇëÌÀáÈùÒÄéí åÌîÄï äÈòÄæÌÄéí, îÄï äÇæÌÀëÈøÄéí åÌîÄï äÇðÌÀ÷ÅáåÉú. åÀðÆàÁëÆìÆú ìÄùÑÀðÅé éÈîÄéí åÀìÇéÀìÈä àÆçÈã:

When is a celebratory [sacrifice] brought with it? When it is brought on a weekday, in [ritual] purity and not much; but when it is brought on Shabbat, too much and in [ritual] impurity a celebratory is not brought with it.

The celebratory came from the flock, the herd, sheep, goats, males and females; and it could be eaten for two days and one night.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:
The Torah [Deuteronomy 16:2] states:

åÀæÈáÇçÀúÌÈ ôÌÆñÇç ìÇéäåÉä àÁìÉäÆéêÈ öÉàï åÌáÈ÷Èø áÌÇîÌÈ÷åÉí àÂùÑÆø éÄáÀçÇø éÀäÉåä ìÀùÑÇëÌÅï ùÑÀîåÉ ùÑÈí:

You shall slaughter the paschal sacrifice to God from the flock and the herd.

The collection of halakhic midrashim, Sifré, notes that this requirement seems to contradict the original requirement of the Torah [Exodus 12:5] that the paschal sacrifice was to be only a sheep or a goat, both of which are 'flock' animals and not 'herd' animals. The Sifré resolves this seeming contradiction by noting that two kinds of offering were made on Nisan 14th: one was the paschal lamb, from the flock, and another, from the herd, was also offered and this was called Chagigah, a celebratory offering. (In all fairness we should also note that 2Chronicles 35:7 also records paschal sacrifices of both flock animals and herd animals, so the Sifré may not be just mere harmonization.)

2:
It seems that this additional offering was a kind of safety precaution 'just in case' there was not enough meat from the paschal lamb itself to serve all the company that had subscribed to the lamb. The 'celebratory' Chagigah was eaten at the Seder before the roast lamb so that the lamb would not be eaten greedily on an empty stomach, but gracefully, elegantly.

DISCUSSION:

The previous mishnah was unusual in that it included details of the discussion that took place among the sages and not just the bare bones of the decision. Yiftah Shapir writes:

This kind of discussion where arguments are being brought in favour or against each opinion is very typical to the Gemara - but very untypical for the Mishnah. Undoubtedly - wherever there is a Maĥloket in the Mishna - the Tannaim had argued a lot and obviously had many arguments - but they are never presented to us. What happened now? why is this mishna different from all the other mishnayot? what is so special about the subject that convinced Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nassi to include not only the opinions but their argumentations as well?

I respond:

This mishnah is not unique. The Gemara is not the only source we have for the way the sages argued their cases: the collections of halakhic midrashim (Mekhilta, Sifra and Sifré) have many such examples. I think that the compiler of the Mishnah included this discussion because it was important to him that it be clear that even though Rabbi Eli'ezer had sound halakhic reasoning to support his view, it was the reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshu'a that was accepted halakhah.


Still in connection with the previous mishnah, David Shemano writes:

You translate the Mishnah to use the word 'logical'. What is the Hebrew word that you are translating? Is it a word that is found in the Bible? I guess my question is whether the concept of 'logic' was picked up from the Greeks and/or would be used in a technical sense as used by the Greek philosophers, or has a technically different meaning?

I respond:

The term used is a technical term which is associated with the particular kind of exposition of the biblical text called Kal va-Chomer. The Hebrew term has several variant forms all except one of which implies the use of logical deduction. However, it is certainly not the kind of logical reasoning that the Greeks have left us that is in use here. Let us say that in a certain case the Torah states quite explicitly what the law is, but in another (allied) case is silent as to the law. The sages seek to apply certain modes of deduction to the biblical text to see if the unknown rule is implied even if it is not explicit. (Not all of the expository methods would be recognized by us as demonstrating the application of logic!)

In the mode in hand the reasoning is logical, but not conclusively so. In is most basic form it says that if the unknown is obviously egregious compared with the known then it is surely logical that the law would be... In other words, the logic is that the answer that I want to espouse is implied in the original text even if it is not made explicit there.

EXPLANATIONS (continued):

3:
Our mishnah teaches when it was acceptable to bring the additional 'celebratory' offering (Chagigah) and when it was not acceptable to do so. It was only brought when Nisan 14th fell on a day other than Shabbat; since this offering was entirely voluntary there was no way in which slaughtering it on Shabbat could be justified.

4:
The whole issue of ritual purity and the paschal lamb is so complicated that it earns a chapter of its own (chapter 9) in this tractate. Even more to the point, it is a separate and specific command in the written Torah [Numbers 9:9-13]. It is sufficient at this point to note that someone who was in a state of ritual impurity was not permitted to partake of the paschal lamb. If there was a situation in which many people were (unexpectedly) in a state of ritual impurity there was no logic in bringing an extra sacrifice, since there may not be enough people to consume the paschal lamb itself. (The written Torah [Exodus 12:10] specifically requires nothing of the paschal lamb to be left over after the Seder; all of it had to be eaten.)

5:
The third consideration concerning the Chagigah was the size of the paschal lamb. If the subscription group was large and the animal small it was a good idea to have another animal to eat as well. In this way, all subscribers would be able to eat the minimum amount of the paschal lamb (an olive's-bulk) and to fill themselves up on the meat from the other animal. If the animal was too large for the size of the group it made no sense to bring another animal as well and to run the risk of having meat left over.

6:
The paschal lamb had to be completely consumed by those present at the Seder by midnight. This restriction was eased in the case of the Chagigah, which could be eaten any time up to dusk on Nisan 15th (first day of Pesaĥ). (The phrase 'two days and one night' indicates Nisan 14th and 15th and the night between them.) The paschal lamb had to be a male sheep or goat; the Chagigah was not thus restricted.

7:
The Chagigah, the voluntary celebratory offering, is commemorated to this day on our Seder dish. Together with the burned shankbone (representing the paschal lamb itself) we have a burned egg (representing the Chagigah). (Those who do not use animal products have alternatives sanctioned by the Talmud.)

DISCUSSION:

I wrote: Rambam suggests (and 750 years later Rav Kuk enthusiastically agreed) that we should see in the rules and regulations of kashrut the first tentative stages of a process designed to wean Jews away from the consumption of dead animals and back to mankind's pristine vegetarianism (culminating in world-wide vegetarianism in the messianic age). Josh Greenfield writes:

I read with interest your comments on Rambam's analysis of the role of the sacrificial system, and the notion that it is merely a stage in our people's development, with the service in the future Temple to take on another form that we cannot envision today. It seems to me, then, that ours is not the first generation to confront the issue of having prayerbooks that express one desire (restoration of sacrifices) and hearts and minds expressing another. I have seen how you deal with this in your excellent siddur Va'ani Tefilati, and I'm thinking in particular of the introduction where you stress the need to mean what you're saying when you pray. I am curious if you can tell me how this has been dealt with by previous generations (i.e., if Rambam was not praying for the restoration of the sacrificial system, what did he say in Musaf?).

I respond:

I do not know what was Rambam's take on the possible restoration of the sacrificial system. In many controversial matters he was careful to leave himself room for manoeuvre. In the 'Guide for the Perplexed' he certainly states that the sacrificial system was a concession at a certain point in history because our people would not have been psychologically ready for an alternative. However, in his halakhic work 'Mishneh Torah' he is careful to bring all the laws of animal sacrifice in complete detail. As far as his own practice is concerned: we do not know. I do not think that this is even mentioned either in his published material or in his private communications. Possibly (I repeat the word 'possibly') he availed himself of the halakhic loophole that he himself mentions in Mishneh Torah, where he brings the text of the prayers:

The people have the custom in all the Musaf (Additional) services, when [the worshipper] says 'as You wrote in Your Torah by Your servant Moses' that he mentions the sacrifices of that day as they are written in the Torah by reciting those verses. But if he did not mention them [specifically], once he says 'as You wrote in Your Torah' he does not have to be more specific.

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If one slaughtered a paschal lamb on Shabbat for a different purpose one must bring a sin-offering to cover it. If one slaughtered any other sacrifice for the purpose of being a paschal lamb - if it is not suitable one is liable; if it is suitable Rabbi Eli'ezer requires a sin-offering but Rabbi Yehoshu'a does not.

Rabbi Eli'ezer said: When a paschal lamb, which is permitted for its own purpose, is offered for another purpose it makes one liable; [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden for their own purpose, is it not logical that one should be liable if they are offered for another purpose? Rabbi Yehoshu'a said: No. If you say that a paschal lamb when offered for another purpose is prohibited, then should you not say that [another] sacrifice when offered for [this] different purpose is permitted? Rabbi Eli'ezer responded: required public sacrifices will prove [my point]: they are permitted for their own purpose but if someone slaughters them for that purpose he is liable. Rabbi Yehoshu'a said to him: No. If you say that about required public sacrifices, whose number is regulated, then you must say [the same thing] about a paschal lamb, whose number is not regulated. Rabbi Me'ir says that even slaughtering [other sacrifices] for the purpose of a required public sacrifice is excused.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:
Our mishnah is concerned with the permissibility or otherwise of offering other sacrifices on Nisan 14th which falls on Shabbat. It states that if on Nisan 14th which falls on Shabbat a person changes his mind at the last moment and slaughters an animal intended for the paschal sacrifice for some other sacrificial purpose instead, he is liable to offer a sin-offering. This is because it is forbidden to offer voluntary (i.e. personal) offerings on Shabbat. On Shabbat in general it is forbidden to slaughter animals (it is even forbidden to trap them!) and an exception is made only in the Bet Mikdash and only for animals sacrificed on that day by the direct requirement of the Torah. When the Bet Mikdash was still in existence an unwitting infringement of Shabbat law required the 'culprit' to expiate the sin by bringing a sin-offering (at some later stage). In our case we can assume that the substitution was made unwittingly in that the person making the substitution either did not know that such a substitution on Shabbat was forbidden or had forgotten that it was Shabbat.

2:
Our mishnah also deals with the reverse situation. Let us imagine a person who had handy a lamb that was originally designated for some other voluntary sacrificial purpose and at the last minute he slaughtered it (on Shabbat 14th Nisan) as a paschal lamb. If the animal thus substituted was not one that was acceptable as a paschal lamb (a yearling male sheep or goat) then this person has desecrated Shabbat by slaughtering an animal which is not sanctioned by the Torah. However, if the animal was acceptable as a paschal lamb there is a maĥloket [difference of opinion] between rabbis Eli'ezer and Yehoshu'a.

3:
Rabbi Eli'ezer holds that such a person must bring a sin-offering as a Sabbath desecrator. He reasons as follows: we are agreed that it is forbidden to slaughter (on Shabbat Nisan 14th) an animal originally designated as a paschal lamb for some other voluntary sacrificial purpose. Now, the slaughter of this animal is prohibited even though its slaughter for its original purpose would have been permissible; the slaughter of any other animal, even for its designated purpose, is forbidden. Is it not then logical to deduce that the slaughter of a paschal lamb for any other purpose is prohibited and incurs the need for a sin-offering?

4:
Rabbi Yehoshu'a disagrees and holds that if the animal actually sacrificed was acceptable as a paschal lamb then the person offering it was excused all blame (even though the animal does not count as a paschal lamb and another must be brought for that purpose). His reasoning is that no sin has been willfully committed: the person making the offering thought that he was fulfilling a mitzvah.

5:
The required sacrifices mentioned by these two sages are sacrifices that the Torah requires us to offer. For example, even on Shabbat the daily Tamid must be offered. Rabbi Eli'ezer reasons that the offering of an animal originally intended for some other sacrificial purpose on Shabbat as one one the Torah- required public offerings of that day is prohibited; this surely indicates that the slaughter of any other animal for any other purpose not required by the Torah for that day is a sin. Rabbi Yehoshu'a rejects this reasoning: everyone knows that only one lamb is slaughtered as the Tamid sacrifice on Shabbat, and any more must therefore be prohibited and no one could claim that 'they didn't know'. The case of the paschal lamb is different: there is no limit to the number of paschal lambs that can be sacrificed and therefore his original reasoning still stands: no sin has been willfully committed since the person making the offering thought that he was fulfilling a mitzvah.

6:
Rabbi Me'ir holds that there is no sin at all involved if someone slaughters an animal on Shabbat intending it to be a required public offering. His view is not accepted halakhah, nor is that of Rabbi Eli'ezer. Accepted halakhah follows Rabbi Yehoshu'a both as regards the paschal lamb and as regards Torah-required public offerings.

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If one slaughtered a paschal lamb for people who will not eat it, are not subscribed to it, are uncircumcised or ritually impure - one is liable. If one slaughtered for [a mixed company of both] people who will and will not eat it, are and are not subscribed to it, are circumcised and are not, are ritually pure and are not - one is excused. If one slaughtered it and [subsequently] discovered that it was damaged one is liable; if one slaughtered it and subsequently discovered that it was damaged internally one is excused. If one slaughtered it and [subsequently] heard that the owners had reneged, died or become ritually impure - one is excused because the slaughtering was done legally.

EXPLANATIONS:

1:
We learned in Pesaĥim 5:3, which reads in part as follows:

A paschal lamb is invalid if it was slaughtered for those who will not eat it, are not subscribed to it, are uncircumcised or ritually impure. It is valid [if it was slaughtered] for [a company which consisted of] both those who would and would not eat it, both those who were and who were not subscribed, both circumcised and uncircumcised persons, and both ritually pure and impure.

Our present mishnah does not repeat that information, but reviews it in a different light. Our present mishnah is not concerned with the validity or otherwise of the paschal sacrifice; it is concerned with the violation or otherwise of the sanctity of Shabbat when the paschal lamb is slaughtered on Shabbat. We recall that the slaughter of animals on Shabbat is forbidden (it is one of the 39 basic actions whose prohibitions 'define' Shabbat). The only exception - as is the case with many Shabbat prohibitions, as we have seen - is the authorized slaughter of animals on Shabbat as part of the ritual of the Bet Mikdash. The emphasis here must be on the word 'authorized': if an animal were slaughtered for an invalid purpose the person who did the slaughtering is in violation of Shabbat sanctity. (Assuming that the violation was unintentional, the 'culprit' is required to bring a sin-offering in exculpation.)

2:
Since we learned in 5:3 that certain persons were not permitted to share a paschal lamb it follows that if the subscription party consisted entirely of such people the slaughtering on Shabbat was invalid and the slaughterer, therefore, liable to bring a sin-offering. (The people involved are those who cannot eat the lamb's meat because of frailty or illness, people who have not subscribed to that particular lamb, Jews who are not circumcised for health reasons or otherwise, and people who are ritually impure.) If the company for whom the lamb was slaughtered was mixed consisting of both valid and invalid participants the slaughtering must be considered valid since it certainly was done for valid people, and since there was thus no Shabbat violation the slaughterer is excused the need to bring a sin-offering.

3:
If the animal designated as the paschal offering has physical defects the offering is invalid, since Exodus 12:5 requires the animal to be physically 'perfect'. It logically follows that an injured animal is an invalid sacrifice and must be replaced. If the sacrifice itself was invalid it follows that killing it was a Shabbat violation and the 'culprit' is liable, since the animal should have been thoroughly examined in advance. If the injury was such that it was impossible for it to be discovered before the slaughtering there is, of course, no violation (though the animal must be replaced).

4:
The last case mentioned by our mishnah is where, after the animal had been slaughtered, one heard that those who had originally subscribed to it had withdrawn and chosen to join a different group (or that they had all died or had all become ritually impure). Such a slaughtering is not to be considered a Sabbath violation since at the moment of sacrifice it was to be assumed that the action was valid and permitted.

DISCUSSION:

When we studied the first mishnah of Chapter 5 we learned that the daily sacrifice is slaughtered at eight and one half hours and is offered at nine and one half... Avraham Arbib asks:

Just how in ancient times was it possible to measure 'one twelfth of the time that lapses between sunrise and sunset on any given day'?

I respond:

We have dealt with this issue before. For example, I once wrote:

In earlier times almost everyone could tell the time of day with just a glance at the sky. The horizon from east to west could be divided into twelve imaginary sections and with practice one could tell in which section of the sky the sun was at any given time, with surprising accuracy. The day began at sunrise, which was by definition zero hour. When the sun had traversed one twelfth of the sky in its westward track the end of the first hour had arrived; when the sun had traversed yet one more twelfth of the sky the end of the second hour had arrived - and so forth. When the sun was at its zenith, right overhead, the time was noon, the end of the sixth hour. The hours would continue to be counted thus until the sun sank below the western horizon, which point was the end of the twelfth hour. Even a child could tell the time very broadly: if the sun was east of the zenith it was still morning; if the sun was right overhead it was noon; and if the sun was westering, past the zenith it was afternoon.

This concludes, at long last, our study of Chapter 6, which was concerned with the peculiar circumstances attending the slaughter of the paschal lamb when Nisan 14th falls on Shabbat.